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Abstract
Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based as-
set pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves em-
pirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of
returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios,
long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit
model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion.
This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one
free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small
deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning
rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast
future stock prices using past information on prices.
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"Investors, their confidence and expectations buoyed by past price increases,
bid up speculative prices further, thereby enticing more investors to do the
same, so that the cycle repeats again and again, ... ”
Irrational Exuberance, Shiller (2005, p.56)
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show that a very simple asset pricing model
is able to reproduce a variety of stylized facts if one allows for small depar-
tures from rational expectations. This result is somehow remarkable, since the
literature in empirical finance had great diﬃculties in developing dynamic equi-
librium rational expectations models accounting for all the asset pricing facts
we consider.
We study the most standard asset pricing equation of dynamic equilibrium
models determining stock prices, This equation arises, for example, in the rep-
resentative agent endowment economy of Lucas (1978) or various other setups
such as overlapping generations models. It is well known that the asset pric-
ing implications of this equation under rational expectations (RE) are at odds
with some basic asset pricing facts: in the data, the price dividend ratio is too
volatile and persistent, stock returns are too volatile, long run excess stock re-
turns are negatively related to the price dividend ratio, and the risk premium
is too high. Our learning model introduces just one additional free parameter
relative to the rational expectations counterpart. With this modification alone,
our model quantitatively accounts for all these observations. Since the learning
model reduces to the rational expectations model if the additional parameter is
set to zero and since this parameter is close to zero throughout the paper, we
consider the learning model to represent only a small departure from rationality.
Nevertheless, the behavior of equilibrium prices diﬀers considerably from that
obtained under rational expectations, implying that the asset pricing implica-
tions of the standard model are not robust to small departures from rationality.
As we document, this non-robustness is empirically encouraging, i.e., the model
matches the data much better if this small departure from rationality is allowed
for.
A large body of literature has documented that stock prices exhibit move-
ments that are very hard to reproduce within the realm of rational expectations
and the baseline model has been extended in a variety of directions to improve
its empirical performance. A particular line of research introduced time-non-
separable preferences for this purpose. After many papers and a couple of
decades this line of research has succeeded: Campbell and Cochrane (1999) are
able to reproduce all the facts, albeit at the cost of imposing a sophisticated
habit specification for preferences and high eﬀective degrees of risk aversion.
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Our model retains simplicity and moderate curvature in utility, but instead
deviates from rational expectations.
In contrast to the RE literature, the behavioral finance literature tried to
understand the decision-making process of individual investors by means of sur-
veys, experiments and micro evidence, exploring the intersection between eco-
nomics and psychology. One of the main themes of this literature was to test
the rationality hypothesis in asset markets, see Shiller (2005) for a non-technical
summary. We borrow some of the economic intuition from this literature, but
follow a diﬀerent modeling approach: we aim for a model that is as close as
possible to the standard model, with agents who formulate forecasts using sta-
tistical models that imply only small departures from rational expectations.
We first show that for a general class of learning schemes the model has the
following properties: if expectations about stock price growth increase in a given
period, the actual growth rate of prices has a tendency to increase beyond the
fundamental growth rate, thereby reinforcing the initial belief of higher stock
price growth. Learning thus imparts ‘momentum’ on stock prices and beliefs
and this produces large and sustained deviations of the price dividend ratio
from its mean, as can be observed in the data. Furthermore, we show that the
model has mean reversion so that even if expectations are very high at some
point they will eventually return to fundamentals. The model thus displays - for
many learning schemes - something like the ‘naturally occurring Ponzi schemes’
described in Shiller’s opening quote above.
In the baseline learning model, we assume agents form their expectations
regarding future stock prices with the most standard learning scheme used in
the literature: ordinary least squares (OLS).1 We show that the equilibrium
converges to rational expectations under OLS, but this process takes a very
long time in this model. Then, the dynamics generated by learning along the
transition cause prices to have the oscillations described in the previous para-
graph for a very long period so that the model behaves in a very diﬀerent way
from RE.
As we mentioned, OLS is the most standard assumption to model the evolu-
tion of expectations functions in the learning literature and its limiting proper-
ties have been used extensively as a stability criterion to justify or discard RE
equilibria. Yet, models of learning are still not commonly used to explain data
or for policy analysis.2 It still is the standard view in the economics research
community that models of learning introduce too many degrees of freedom, so
that it is easy to find a learning scheme that matches whatever observation one
desires. One can deal with this important methodological issue in two ways:
first, by using a learning scheme with as few free parameters as possible, and
second, by imposing restrictions on the parameters of the learning scheme to
only allow for small departures of rationality.3 These considerations prompted
1We show that results are robust to using other standard learning rules.
2We will mention some exceptions along the paper.
3Marcet and Nicolini (2003) dealt with this issue by imposing bounds on the size of the
mistakes agents can make in equilibrium. These bounds imposed discipline both on the type
of learning rule and on the exact value of the parameters in the learning rule.
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us to use an oﬀ-the-shelf learning scheme (OLS) that assumes agents revise their
expectations in the direction of the last forecast error and that has only one free
parameter. In addition, in the model at hand, OLS is the best estimator in the
long run (as we prove), and to make the departure from rationality during the
transition small, we assume in our quantitative analysis that initial beliefs are at
the rational expectations equilibrium, and that agents initially have very strong
- but less than complete - confidence in these initial beliefs. If agents had full
confidence in these beliefs, the model would reduce to its RE counterpart.
Models of learning have been used before to explain some aspects of asset
price behavior. Timmermann (1993, 1996), Brennan and Xia (2001) and Cog-
ley and Sargent (2006) consider Bayesian learning to explain various aspects
of stock prices. These authors consider agents who learn about the dividend
process and assume agents to use the mean of the Bayesian posterior about
some relevant unknown parameter to evaluate the discounted sum of dividends.4
This approach is less able to explain asset price volatility: while agents’ beliefs
about the dividend process influence market prices, agents’ beliefs remain un-
aﬀected by market outcomes because agents learn only about an exogenous
driving process. One could say that expectations in these papers are ‘anchored’
by the dividend process. In the language of stochastic control, these models are
not self-referential and this is why, in the language of Shiller, they can not give
rise to ‘naturally occurring Ponzi schemes’. In contrast, we largely abstract
from learning about the dividend process and consider learning on the future
stock price using past price observations, so that beliefs and prices are mutually
determined. It is precisely the learning about future stock price growth and
its self-referential nature that imparts momentum to expectations and is key in
explaining stock price volatility.5
Other related papers by Bullard and Duﬀy (2001) and Brock and Hommes
(1998) show that learning dynamics can converge to complicated attractors, if
the RE equilibrium is unstable under learning dynamics.6 Branch and Evans
(2006) study a model where agents’ algorithm to form expectations switches
depending on which of the available forecast models is performing best. Marcet
and Sargent (1992) also study convergence to RE in a model where agents use
today’s price to forecast the price tomorrow in a stationary environment with
private information. By comparison, we look at learning about the stock price
growth rate in an economy with dividend growth, we address more closely the
data, and we do so in a model where the rational expectations equilibrium is
stable under learning dynamics, so the departure from RE behavior occurs only
along a transition related to the sample size of the observed data. Also related
is Cárceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) who assume that agents know the
4 In Cogley and Sargent (2006) the mean is driven by agents’ initial pessimism.
5Timmerman (1996) also analyzes a case where learning is self-referential, but in his case
agents use dividends to predict future price. He finds that this form of self-referential learning
delivers lower volatility than settings with learning about the dividend process. It is thus
crucial for our results that agents use information on past price behavior to predict future
price.
6 Stability under learning dynamics is defined in Marcet and Sargent (1989).
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mean stock price and learn only about deviations from the mean; they find that
the presence of learning does then not significantly alter the behavior of asset
prices.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts we fo-
cus on and the basic features of the underlying asset pricing model, showing that
this model cannot explain the facts under the rational expectations hypothesis.
In section 3 we take the simplest risk neutral model and assume instead that
agents learn to forecast the growth rate of prices. We show that such a model
can qualitatively deliver all the considered asset pricing facts for a very general
class of learning schemes. We then show that least squares learning converges
to rational expectations. We also explain how the deviations from rational ex-
pectations can be made arbitrarily small. In section 4 we present the baseline
learning model with risk aversion and the baseline calibration procedure. Sec-
tion 5 shows that the baseline model can quantitatively reproduce all the facts
discussed in section 2. The robustness of our findings to various assumptions
about the model, the learning rule, or the calibration procedure is illustrated in
section 6.
Readers interested in obtaining a glimpse of the quantitative performance of
the baseline model may - after reading section 2 - directly jump to table 4 in
section 5.
2 Facts
This section describes stylized facts of U.S. stock price data and explains why it
proved diﬃcult to reproduce them using standard rational expectations models.
The facts presented in this section have been extensively documented in the
literature. We reproduce them here as a point of reference for our quantitative
exercise in the latter part of the paper and using a single and updated data set.8
It is useful to start looking at the data through the lens of a simple dynamic
stochastic endowment economy. There is an inelastically supplied stock that
can be purchased or sold at any period in a competitive market. Each unit of
the stock purchased in the previous period pays dividends Dt in period t. The
dividend evolves according to
Dt
Dt−1
= aεt (1)
where log εt ∼ iiN (− s22 , s2) and a ≥ 1.9 Obviously, this assumption guarantees
that E(εt) = 1, E
³
Dt
Dt−1
´
= a and σ∆D
D
= s.
7Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) determine the misspecification in beliefs about future
consumption growth required to match the equity premium and other moments of asset prices.
8Details on the underlying data sources are provided in Appendix A.1.
9As documented in Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) and Campbell (2003), this is a
reasonable first approximation to the empirical behavior of quarterly dividends in the U.S. It
is also the standard assumption in the literature.
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The price of the stock Pt depends on the particular model used. We focus,
as most of the literature, on the pricing equation
Pt = δEt
∙
U 0(Dt+1)
U 0(Dt)
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
¸
. (2)
This formula for the equilibrium value of the asset price can be derived from
many alternative models. For instance, it is the solution in the original for-
mulation of Lucas (1978), in which homogeneous consumers live forever, have
discount factor δ and U is the instantaneous utility function. It is also the equi-
librium condition in a two-period overlapping generations model in which δ and
U have the same interpretation.10 Alternatively, it may be obtained from no-
arbitrage relationships in partial equilibrium models. The specific underlying
model is not relevant for the discussion in this section but will be important in
section 3, when we introduce bounded rationality.
Equation (2) defines a mapping from the exogenous dividend process to the
stochastic process of prices.11 The nature of this mapping obviously depends on
the way the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution moves with consump-
tion. For example, in the standard case of power preferences, U(Ct) =
C1−γt
1−γ ,
equation (2) becomes
Pt = δEt
∙µ
Dt
Dt+1
¶γ
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
¸
(3)
With rational expectations about next period price, the no-bubble equilibrium
stock price satisfies12
Pt =
δβRE
1− δβRE
Dt (4)
where
βRE = a1−γe−γ(1−γ)
s2
2 (5)
Et
µµ
Dt
Dt+1
¶γ
PREt+1
¶
= βREPREt (6)
Equation (4) then implies that the price-dividend (PD) ratio in this model is
constant over time and states. Figure 1 confronts this prediction with the actual
evolution of quarterly PD ratio in the U.S.13 To obtain annualized PD ratios
one would have to divide the reported values by four. Compared to the simple
10A specific example with overlapping generations is provided in Appendix A.2.
11This is the case because the models mentioned above equate consumption Ct with divi-
dends Dt. In the data consumption is much less volatile than dividends. This raises important
issues that we discuss later in the paper. For the discussion in this section this distinction
does not matter.
12To see that this is a RE equilibrium note that if prices satisfy (4), then (6) holds, and
plugging this equation in (3) gives back (4).
13Throughout the paper we follow Campbell (2003) and account for seasonalities in dividend
payments by averaging actual payments over the last 4 quarters.
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Figure 1: Quarterly U.S. price dividend ratio 1927:1-2005:4
model we just described, the historical PD ratio exhibits rather large fluctuations
around its sample mean (the horizontal line in the graph). For example, the PD
ratio takes on values below 30 in the year 1932 and values close to 350 in the
year 2000. This large discrepancy between the prediction of the basic model and
the data is also illustrated in table 1, which shows that the standard deviation
of the PD ratio (σPD) is almost one half of its sample mean (E(PD)). This
demonstrates the following asset pricing fact:
Fact 1: The PD ratio is very volatile.
It follows that matching the observed volatility of the PD ratio under rational
expectations requires alternative preference specifications. Indeed, maintaining
the assumptions of i.i.d. dividend growth and of a representative agent, the
behavior of the marginal rate of substitution is the only degree of freedom left
to the theorist. This explains the development of a large and interesting lit-
erature exploring time-non-separability in consumption or consumption habits.
Introducing habits amounts to consider consumers whose instantaneous utility
function is given by U(Ct), where Ct = H(Ct, Ct−1, Ct−2, ..) is a function of cur-
rent and past consumption. A simple habit model was studied by Abel (1990)
who assumed
Ct =
Ct
Cκt−1
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with κ ∈ (0, 1).14 In this case, the stock price under rational expectations is
Pt
Dt
= A (aεt)
κ(γ−1) (7)
for some constant A. This equation shows that this model can give rise to a
volatile PD ratio. Yet, with εt being i.i.d. the PD ratio will display no auto-
correlation, which is in stark contrast to the empirical evidence. As figure 1
illustrates, the PD ratio displays rather persistent deviations from its sample
mean. Indeed, as table 1 shows, the quarterly autocorrelation of the PD ratio
(denoted ρPD,−1) is very high. Therefore, this is the second fact we focus on:
Fact 2: The PD ratio is persistent.
The previous observations suggest that matching the volatility and persis-
tence of the PD ratio under rational expectations would require a model that
gives rise to a volatile and persistent marginal rate of substitution. This is the
avenue pursued in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) who engineer preferences that
can match the behavior of the PD ratio we observe in Figure 1. Their speci-
fication also helps in replicating the asset pricing facts mentioned later in this
section, as well as other facts not mentioned here.15 Their solution requires,
however, imposing a very high degree of relative risk aversion and relies on a
fairly sophisticated structure for the habit function H (·).16
In our model we maintain the assumption of standard time-separable con-
sumption preferences with moderate degrees of risk aversion. Instead, we relax
the rational expectations assumption by replacing the mathematical expectation
in equation (2) by the most standard learning algorithm used in the literature.
Persistence and volatility of the price dividend ratio will then be the result of
adjustments in beliefs that are induced by the learning process.
Before getting into the details of our model, we want to mention three addi-
tional asset pricing facts about stock returns. These facts have received consid-
erable attention in the literature and are qualitatively related to the behavior
of the PD ratio, as we discuss below.
Fact 3: Stock returns are ‘excessively’ volatile.
Starting with the work of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) it
has been recognized that stock prices are more volatile in the data than in
standard models. Related to this is the observation that the volatility of stock
returns (σrs) in the data is almost four times the volatility of dividend growth
14 Importantly, the main purpose of Abel’s model was to generate an ‘equity premium’ - a
fact we discuss below - not to reproduce the behavior of the price dividend ratio.
15They also match the pro-cyclical variation of stock prices and the counter-cyclical variation
of stock market volatility. We have not explored conditional moments in our learning model,
see also the discussion at the end of this section.
16They use a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 35 in steady state and higher still in
states with ‘low surplus consumption ratios’.
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(σ∆D/D), see table 1.17 The observed return volatility has been called ‘excessive’
mainly because the rational expectations model with time-separable preferences
predicts approximately identical volatilities. To see this, let rst denote the stock
return
rst =
Pt +Dt − Pt−1
Pt−1
=
"
Pt
Dt
+ 1
Pt−1
Dt−1
#
Dt
Dt−1
− 1 (8)
and since with time-separable preferences and i.i.d. dividend growth the PD
ratio is constant and very large, the term in the square brackets above is ap-
proximately equal to one so σrs is almost equal to σ∆D/D.
From equation (8) follows that excessive return volatility is qualitatively re-
lated to Fact 1 discussed above, as return volatility depends partly on the volatil-
ity of the PD ratio.18 Yet, quantitatively return volatility also depends on the
volatility of dividend growth and - up to a linear approximation - on the first
two moments of the cross-correlogram between the PD ratio and the rate of
growth of dividends. Since the main contribution of the paper is to show the
ability of the learning model to account for the quantitative properties of the
data, we treat the volatility of returns as a separate asset pricing fact.
U.S. asset pricing facts, 1927:2-2005:4
(quarterly real values, growth rates & returns in percentage terms)
Fact 1 Volatility of E(PD) 113.20
PD ratio σPD 52.98
Fact 2 Persistence of ρPD,−1 0.92
PD ratio
Fact 3 Excessive return σrs 11.65
volatility σ∆D
D
2.98
Fact 4 Excess return c25 -0.0048
predictability R25 0.1986
Fact 5 Equity premium E [rs] 2.41
E
£
rb
¤
0.18
Table 1: Stylized asset pricing facts
17This is not due to the fact that we took averages in order to account for seasonalities in
quarterly dividends. Even at yearly frequency stock returns are about three times as volatile
as dividend growth.
18Cochrane (2005) provides a detailed derivation of the qualitative relationship between
facts 3 and 1 for i.i.d. dividend growth.
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Fact 4: Excess stock returns are predictable over the long-run.
While stock returns are diﬃcult to predict in general at short horizons, the
PD ratio is negatively related to future excess stock returns in the long run.
This is illustrated in Table 2, which shows the results of regressing future cu-
mulated excess returns over diﬀerent horizons on today’s price dividend ratio.19
The absolute value of the parameter estimate and the R2 both increase with
the horizon. As argued in Cochrane (2005, chapter 20), the presence of return
predictability and the increase in the R2 with the prediction horizon are quali-
tatively a joint consequence of Fact 2 and i.i.d. dividend growth. Nevertheless,
we keep excess return predictability as an independent result, since we are again
interested in the quantitative model implications. Yet, Cochrane also shows that
the absolute value of the regression parameter increases approximately linearly
with the prediction horizon, which is a quantitative result. For this reason, we
summarize the return predictability evidence using the regression outcome for a
single prediction horizon. We choose to include the 5 year horizon in table 1.20
Years Coeﬃcient on PD, c2s R
2
1 -0.0008 0.0438
3 -0.0023 0.1196
5 -0.0048 0.1986
10 -0.0219 0.3285
Table 2: Excess stock return predictability
Fact 5: The equity premium puzzle.
Finally, and even though the emphasis of our paper is on moments of the
PD ratio and stock returns, it is interesting to note that learning also improves
the ability of the standard model to match the equity premium puzzle, i.e., the
observation that stock returns - averaged over long time spans and measured in
real terms - tend to be high relative to short-term real bond returns. The equity
premium puzzle is illustrated in table 1, which shows the average quarterly real
return on bonds (E
¡
rbt
¢
) being much lower than the corresponding return on
stocks (E (rst )).
Unlike Campbell and Cochrane (1999) we do not include in our list of facts
any correlation between stock market data and real variables such as consump-
tion or investment. In this sense, we follow more closely the literature in fi-
nance. In our model, it is the learning scheme that delivers the movement in
stock prices, even in a model with risk neutrality in which the marginal rate
of substitution is constant. This contrasts with the habit literature where the
19More precisely, the table reports results from OLS estimation of
Xt,t+s = c1s + c
2
sPDt + u
s
t
for s = 1, 3, 5, 10, where Xt,t+s is the observed real excess return of stocks over bonds between
t and t+ s. The second column of Table 2 reports estimates of c2s.
20We also used longer and shorter horizons. This did not aﬀect our findings.
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movement of stock prices is obtained by modeling the way the observed sto-
chastic process for consumption generates movements in the marginal rate of
substitution. The latter explains why the habit literature focuses on the rela-
tionship between particularly low values of consumption and low stock prices.
Since this mechanism does not play a significant role in our model, we abstract
from these asset pricing facts.
3 The risk neutral case
In this section we analyze the simplest asset pricing model assuming risk neu-
trality γ = 0. As in the rest of the paper, we will now maintain time-separable
preferences Ct = Ct. The goal of this section is to derive qualitative results
and to show how the introduction of learning improves the performance com-
pared to a setting with rational expectations. Sections 4 and 5 present a formal
quantitative model evaluation, extending the analysis to risk-averse investors.
With risk neutrality and rational expectations the model is far from explaining
any of the asset pricing facts described in the previous section: the PD ratio is
constant, stock returns are unforecastable (i.i.d.) at any horizon, approximately
as volatile as dividend growth, i.e., do not display excess volatility. In addi-
tion, there is no equity premium.21 For these reasons, the risk-neutral model
is particularly suited to illustrate how the introduction of learning qualitatively
improves model performance.
The consumer has beliefs about future variables (prices and dividends), sum-
marized in expectations denoted eE, that we allow to be less than fully rational.
Then, equation (3) becomes
Pt = δ eEt (Pt+1 +Dt+1) (9)
This asset pricing equation will be the focus of our analysis in this section.
The key feature that we exploit in this equation, is that today’s stock price
is determined by tomorrow’s expected price. Alternatively, some papers in the
learning literature22 have studied stock prices when agents formulate expecta-
tions about the discounted sum of all future dividends and equilibrium prices
satisfy
Pt = eEt ∞X
j=1
δjDt+j (10)
When agents learn about the discounted sum of dividends, the model has much
lower chances to generate large asset price volatility. This is so because agents
are learning about the parameters of the underlying dividend process, which
evolves exogenously to the evolution of stock prices. While market prices then
depend on agents’ beliefs about the dividend process, the market outcomes fail
21We do not mention the serial correlation of PD ratio because the RE model implies a
constant PD ratio so its serial correlation is undefined.
22For example, Timmermann (1993, 1996), Brennan and Xia (2001), Cogley and Sargent
(2006).
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to feed back into agents’ expectations. This severely limits the ability of the
model to generate interesting ‘data-like’ behavior. In contrast, the one-period
formulation (9) requires agents to estimate the parameters driving the stock
price process, i.e., to estimate the process of an endogenous variable. As a
result, agents beliefs about the stock price process influence the actual behavior
of stock prices and actual price behavior feeds back into agents beliefs. It is this
self-referential nature of our model that makes it attractive in explaining the
data.
It is well known that under RE the one-period ahead formulation of (9) is
equivalent to the discounted sum expression for prices.23 However, this fails
to be the case under learning. There exist a number of theoretical reasons
justifying the focus on the one-step-ahead formulation. A particular one is
given in appendix A.2 which describes a two-period overlapping generations
model where the optimality condition of agents is indeed given by (9). As
shown in the appendix, individual agents do not care about the discounted sum
of dividends (10) because they know that they will have to sell the stock in the
second period of their life. This appendix makes the current paper self-contained
in providing a justification for using (9).
In a companion paper (Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2008)) we provide ad-
ditional and more detailed theoretical reasons for preferring the one-step-ahead
formulation (9). A summary follows.
First, note that a Bayesian agent would demand stocks until the first order
condition
Pt = Dt E
BAY
t
µ
δa
1− δa
¶
(11)
holds, where EBAYt is the expectation based on the Bayesian posterior using
information up to t. Since the denominator 1− δa is close to zero, uncertainty
about the true value of the mean dividend growth rate a is likely to make the
above expectation very large, possibly even infinite. Specifically, the size of
the valuation error depends critically on the support of agents’ prior beliefs
about a. Therefore, a small amount of prior uncertainty about the true value
of a can induce the Bayesian agent to be willing to buy the stock at a very
high or even infinite price, something that ex-post will appear as a very large
‘error’. For this reason, a Bayesian agent who uses (11) to price the asset will
not necessarily outperform the agents considered in this paper who use a simple
learning scheme. This issue fails to show up in the literature studying discounted
sums we mentioned above because it uses the pricing formula
Pt =
δ EBAYt (a)
1− δ EBAYt (a)
. (12)
As is well recognized in this literature, this shortcut amounts to assuming that
agents ignore their uncertainty about the true value of a. A fully Bayesian
23More precisely, equivalence is obtained if ?Et [·] = Et [·] and if the no-rational-bubble
requirement limj→∞ δj EPt+j = 0 holds.
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agent would use the entire posterior distribution of a to evaluate the expected
discounted sum as in (11).
Second, we show that agents may care about forecasting future price as in (9)
even if they live infinitely many periods. We demonstrate this using a heteroge-
neous agent model where markets are incomplete due to shortselling constraints.
The market incompleteness drives a wedge between individual discount factor
and market discount factor because agents occasionally strictly prefer to sell
the asset at equilibrium prices. Assuming that agents are individually perfectly
rational, in the sense that they know their utility and their constraints and that
they maximize utility given prices, implies that a version of (9) holds. Moreover,
these agents cannot simply iterate on their first order conditions (9) to obtain
the infinite sum representation (10) of prices in terms of future dividends only,
unless they have very detailed knowledge of how the stock market works. In par-
ticular, they need to know the market discount factor (which diﬀers from their
own discount factor) but also that there are no rational bubbles. Agents without
such information will have to formulate expectations about future prices. We
illustrate this point in appendix A.2 for the overlapping generations economy.
For all these reasons we believe that our one-period formulation (9) is an
interesting avenue to explore.
3.1 Analytical results
In this section we show that the introduction of learning changes qualitatively
the behavior of stock prices in the direction of improving the match with the
stylized facts described above. At this point we consider a wide class of learning
schemes that includes the standard rules used in the literature. This serves to
prove that the eﬀects we discuss occur in a general class of learning models.
Later on we will restrict attention to learning schemes that forecast well within
the model.
We first trivially rewrite the expectation of the agent by splitting the sum
in the expectation:
Pt = δ eEt (Pt+1) + δ eEt (Dt+1) (13)
We assume that agents know how to formulate the conditional expectation of
the dividend eEt (Dt+1) = aDt. This assumption is for simplicity, it clarifies
that it is learning about future prices that allows the model to better match the
data. In Appendix A.5 we show that these theoretical pricing implications are
very similar, and in section 6 we verify that the quantitative implications barely
change when we introduce learning about dividends.
Agents are assumed to use a learning scheme in order to form a forecasteEt(Pt+1) based on past information. Equation (4) shows that under rational
expectations the growth of stock prices is constant, since Et
£
PREt+1
¤
= βREPREt .
As we restrict our analysis to learning rules that behave close enough to rational
expectations, we specify expectations under learning as
eEt [Pt+1] = βt Pt (14)
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where βt > 0 denotes agents’ time t estimate of gross stock price growth. For
βt = a, agents’ beliefs coincide with rational expectations. Also, if agents’
beliefs converge over time to the RE equilibrium (limt→∞ βt = a), investors will
realize in the long-run that they were correct in using the functional form (14).
Yet, during the transition beliefs may deviate from rational ones.
It remains to specify how agents update their beliefs βt. The focus of our
analysis will be the following general learning mechanism
∆βt = ft
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¶
(15)
for some exogenously chosen functions ft : R→ R with the properties
ft(0) = 0
ft (·)increasing
We thus assume that beliefs adjust in the direction of the last prediction error,
i.e., agents revise beliefs upwards (downwards) if their expectations last period
underpredicted (overpredicted) the stock price growth that was actually realized
in this period.24 Arguably, a learning scheme that violates these conditions
would appear quite unnatural.
As in many learning papers, we need to restrict the above learning scheme
further so as to guarantee that beliefs remain bounded. In this section, we
simply use a projection facility which assumes that agents ignore observations
that would cause their expected price growth to be excessively high:
∆βt =
(
ft
³
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
if βt−1 + ft
³
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
< βU
0 otherwise
(16)
This projection facility has been used in many learning papers, including Tim-
mermann (1993, 1996), Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) and Cogley and Sargent (2006). Throughout the paper we will refer to
(16) as the ”standard” projection facility. We give some interpretation of this
after equation (17). In section 4 we use a diﬀerent and less standard projection
facility for numerical reasons. In the text we will often provide intuition refer-
ring to (15) since it is the equation that holds most periods, but in all formal
results and in the proofs we use (16).
At this point, we show that the key features of the model emerge within this
general specification. We will later specialize the learning scheme in section 3.2
to obtain quantitative and convergence results.
24Note that βt is determined from observations up to period t − 1 only. The assumption
that the current price does not enter in the formulation of the expectations is common in the
learning literature and is entertained for simplicity. Diﬃculties emerging with simultaneous
information sets are discussed in Adam (2003).
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3.1.1 Stock prices under learning
Given the perceptions βt, the expectation function (14), and the assumption on
perceived dividends, equation (13) implies that prices under learning satisfy
Pt =
δaDt
1− δβt
. (17)
Assuming that βU ≤ δ−1 guarantees that all prices are positive and finite. One
interpretation is that if the last observed price growth implies beliefs that are
too high, agents realize that this would prompt a crazy action (infinite stock
demand) and they would ignore this observation, as dictated by the projection
facility. Obviously, it is equivalent to require that the PD is less than the upper
bound UPD ≡ δa
1−δβU , therefore an alternative interpretation is that if the PD
is higher than this upper bound agents will start fearing a downturn and they
will bring their expectations down. Yet another interpretation is that if PD
is too high, some government agency will intervene to bring the price down.25
In the simulations that we report below this facility is binding only rarely and
the properties of the learning model are not sensitive to the precise value we
assign to βU , so in the remainder of this subsection 3.1 we give intuition on the
dynamics of the model by focusing on (15).
Since βt and εt are independent, the previous equation implies that
V ar
µ
ln
Pt
Pt−1
¶
= V ar
µ
ln
1− δβt−1
1− δβt
¶
+ V ar
µ
ln
Dt
Dt−1
¶
, (18)
and shows that price growth under learning is more volatile than dividend
growth. Clearly, this occurs because the volatility of beliefs adds to the volatility
generated by fundamentals. While this intuition is present in previous models of
learning, e.g., Timmermann (1993), it will be particular to our case that under
more specific learning schemes V ar
³
ln 1−δβt1−δβt+1
´
is likely to be high and remain
high for a long time.
Equation (17) shows that the PD ratio is monotonically related to beliefs βt.
One can thus understand the qualitative dynamics of the PD ratio by studying
the belief dynamics. To derive these dynamics notice
Pt
Pt−1
= T (βt,∆βt) εt (19)
where
T (β,∆β) ≡ a+ aδ ∆β
1− δβ (20)
25To mention one such intervention that has been documented in detail, Voth (2003) ex-
plains how the German central bank intervened indirectly in 1927 to reduce lending to equity
investors. This intervention was prompted by a ”genuine concern about the ’exuberant’ level of
the stock market” on the part of the central bank and it caused stock prices to go down sharply.
More recently, announcements by central bankers (the famous speech by Alan Greenspan on
October 16th 1987) or interest rate increases may have played a similar role.
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It follows directly from (19) that Et(Pt+1/Pt) = T (βt,∆βt). Therefore, T (βt,∆βt)
is the actual expected stock price growth given that the perceived price growth
has been given by βt,∆βt. Substituting (19) in the law of motion for beliefs (16)
we have that the dynamics of βt (t ≥ 1) are fully described by a second-order
stochastic diﬀerence equation
∆βt+1 = ft+1 (T (βt,∆βt)εt − βt) (21)
for given initial conditions (D0, P−1), and initial belief β0. This equation can
not be solved analytically due to non-linearities,26 but it is still possible to gain
qualitative insights into the belief dynamics of the model. We do this in the
next section.
3.1.2 Deterministic dynamics
To discuss the dynamics of beliefs βt under learning, we simplify matters by
considering the deterministic case in which εt ≡ 1. Equation (21) then simplifies
to
∆βt+1 = ft+1 (T (βt,∆βt)− βt) (22)
We thus restrict attention to the endogenous stock price dynamics generated
by the learning mechanism rather than the dynamics induced by exogenous
disturbances. Given the properties of ft, equation (22) shows that beliefs are
increasing whenever T (βt,∆βt) > βt, i.e., whenever actual stock price growth
exceeds expected stock price growth. Understanding the evolution of beliefs
thus requires studying the T -mapping.
We start by noting that the actual stock price growth implied by T depends
not only on the level of price growth expectations βt but also on the change
4βt. This imparts momentum on stock prices, leading to a feedback between
expected and actual stock price growth. Formally we state the following result
Momentum: If βt ≤ a and ∆βt > 0, then27
∆βt+1 > 0
It also holds if all inequalities are reversed.
Therefore, if agents arrived at the rational expectations belief βt = a from
below (4βt > 0), the price growth generated by the learning model would
keep growing and it would exceed the fundamental growth rate a. Just because
agents’ expectations have become more optimistic (in what a journalist would
perhaps call a ‘bullish’ market), the price growth in the market has a tendency
26Notice that even in the case we consider in the next section where ft is linear, the diﬀerence
equation is non-linear due to the presence of T .
27This follows trivially from the fact that, given the definition of T, it follow that ∆βt > 0
implies T (βt,∆βt) > a so that β has to increase. Of course, this holds if the projection facility
does not apply
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to be larger than the growth in fundamentals. Since agents will use this higher-
than-fundamental stock price growth to update their beliefs in the next period,
βt+1 will tend to overshoot a, which will further reinforce the upward tendency.
Since beliefs are monotonically related to the PD ratio, see equation (17), there
will be momentum in the stock price, resembling a ‘naturally arising Ponzi
process’. Conversely, if βt = a in a bearish market (∆βt < 0), beliefs and price
growth display downward momentum, i.e., a tendency to undershoot the RE
value.
It can be shown, however, that stock prices and beliefs can not stay at
levels unjustified by fundamentals forever and that after any deviation they will
eventually move towards the fundamental value. Furthermore, it turns out that
when the price starts going down it does so monotonically until it arrives at (or
surpasses) the fundamental value. Formally, under some additional technical
assumptions we have the following result
Mean reversion: 28 If in some period t we have βt > a, given η > 0 suﬃ-
ciently small, there is a finite period t00 > t such that βt00 < a+ η.
Furthermore, oscillations are monotonic in the sense that letting t0 be the
first period t00 ≥ t0 ≥ t such that ∆βt0 < 0, then β is non-decreasing
between t and t0 and it is non-increasing between t0 and t00.
Symmetrically, if βt < a eventually βt00 > a − η and oscillations are
monotonic.
Since η can be chosen arbitrarily small, the previous statement shows that
even if beliefs are much higher than fundamentals they will eventually move
back arbitrarily close to or below fundamentals. The monotone relationship
between beliefs and the PD ratio implies mean reverting behavior of the PD
ratio.
Momentum and mean reversion are also illustrated by the study of the phase
diagram for the dynamics of the beliefs (βt, βt−1). Figure 2 illustrates the direc-
tion that beliefs move, according to equation (22).29 The arrows in the figure
thereby indicate the direction in which the diﬀerence equation is going to move
for any possible state (βt, βt−1) and the solid lines indicate the boundaries of
these areas.30 Since we have a diﬀerence rather than a diﬀerential equation, we
cannot plot the evolution of beliefs exactly. Nevertheless, the arrows suggest
that the beliefs are likely to move in ellipses around the rational expectations
equilibrium (βt, βt−1) = (a, a). Consider, for example, point A in the diagram.
Although at this point βt is already below its fundamental value, the phase dia-
gram indicates that beliefs will fall further. This is the result of the momentum
induced by the fact that βt < βt−1 at point A. Beliefs can go, for example,
28See Appendix A.3 for the assumptions and the proof. Note also that, even though in the
informal discussion of the text we ignore the projection facility, the proof in Appendix A.3
uses the projection facility.
29Appendix A.4 explains in detail the construction of the phase diagram.
30The vertical solid line close to δ−1 is meant to illustrate the restriction β < δ−1 imposed
on the learning rule.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram illustruating momentum and mean-reversion
to point B where they will start to revert direction and move on to points C
then, to D etc.: beliefs thus display mean reversion. The elliptic movements
imply that beliefs (and thus the PD ratio) are likely to oscillate in sustained
and persistent swings around a.
Momentum together with the mean reversion allows the model to match the
volatility and serial correlation of the PD ratio (facts 1 and 2). Also, according
to our discussion around equation (18), momentum imparts variability to the
ratio
1−δβt−1
1−δβt
and is likely to deliver more volatile stock returns (fact 3). As
discussed in Cochrane (2005), a serially correlated and mean reverting PD ratio
should give rise to excess return predictability (fact 4).
These results held for a very general class of learning schemes. The next
section specializes the learning scheme, allowing to prove asymptotic results
and to study by simulation that introducing learning in the risk-neutral model
causes a big improvement in the ability of the model to explain stock price
volatility. It can also generate a sizable equity premium (fact 5).
3.2 The Risk Neutral Model with OLS
3.2.1 The learning rule
We specialize the learning rule by assuming the most common learning schemes
used in the literature on learning about expectations. We assume the standard
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updating equation from the stochastic control literature
βt = βt−1 +
1
αt
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¶
(23)
for all t ≥ 1, for a given sequence of αt ≥ 1, and a given initial belief β0 which
is given outside the model.31 This assumes ft to be linear. The values 1/αt are
called the ‘gain’ sequence, they dictate how strongly beliefs are updated in the
direction of the last prediction error. In this section, we assume the simplest
possible specification:
αt = αt−1 + 1 t ≥ 2 (24)
α1 ≥ 1 given.
With these assumptions the model evolves as follows. In the first period, β0 de-
termines the first price P0 and, given the historical price P−1, the first observed
growth rate P0P−1 , which is used to update beliefs to β1 using (23); the belief β1
determines P1 and the process evolves recursively in this manner. As in any
self-referential model of learning, prices enter in the determination of beliefs and
vice versa. As we argued in the previous section, it is this feature of the model
that generates the dynamics we are interested in.
Using simple algebra, equation (23) implies
βt =
1
t+ α1 − 1
⎛
⎝
t−1X
j=0
Pj
Pj−1
+ (α1 − 1) β0
⎞
⎠ .
Obviously, if α1 = 1 this is just the sample average of the stock price growth
and, therefore, it amounts to OLS if only a constant is used in the regression
equation. For the case where α1 is an integer, this expression shows that βt is
equal to the average sample growth rate, if - in addition to the actually observed
prices - we would have (α1 − 1) observations of a growth rate equal to β0. A
high α1 thus indicates that agents possess a high degree of ‘confidence’ in their
initial belief β0.
In a Bayesian interpretation, β0 would be the prior mean of stock price
growth, (α1− 1) the precision of the prior, and - assuming that the growth rate
of prices is normally distributed and i.i.d. - the beliefs βt would be equal to the
posterior mean. One might thus be tempted to argue that βt is eﬀectively a
Bayesian estimator. Obviously, this is only true for a ‘Bayesian’ placing prob-
ability one on PtPt−1 being i.i.d. Since learning causes price growth to deviate
from i.i.d. behavior along the transition, such priors fail to contain the ‘grain of
truth’ (along the transition) that should be present in Bayesian analysis. Since
the i.i.d. assumption will hold asymptotically (we will prove this later on), the
learning scheme is a Bayesian estimator in the long run.32
31 In the long-run the particular initial value β0 is of little importance.
32 In a proper Bayesian formulation agents would use a likelihood function with the property
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For the case α1 = 1, βt is just the sample average of stock price growth, i.e.,
agents have no confidence in their initial belief β0. In this case β0 matters only
for the first period, but ceases to aﬀect anything after the first piece of data has
arrived. More generally, assuming a value for α1 close to 1 would spuriously
generate a large amount of price fluctuations, simply due to the fact that initial
beliefs are heavily influenced by the first few observations and thus very volatile.
Also, pure OLS assumes that agents have no faith whatsoever in their initial
belief and possess no knowledge about the economy in the beginning.
In the spirit of restricting equilibrium expectations in our learning model to
be close to rational, in the simulations of section 5 we set initial beliefs equal to
the value of the growth rate of prices under RE
β0 = a
and choose a very large α1. Thus, we assume that beliefs start at the RE value,
and that the initial degree of confidence in the RE belief is high, but not perfect.
Clearly, in the limit as 1/α1 → 0 our learning model reduces to the RE model
in all periods, so that the initial gain 1/α1 can be interpreted as a measure of
‘distance’ of the learning model from to the rational expectations model. The
maximum distance from RE is achieved for 1/α1 = 1, i.e., pure OLS learning.
Finally, we need to introduce the projection facility in (23) as described
before.
3.2.2 Asymptotic Rationality
In this section we study the limiting behavior of the model under learning. The
literature on convergence of least squares learning shows that the T -mapping
defined in equation (20) is central to whether or not the economy converges
to RE.33 It is now well established that in a large class of models convergence
(divergence) of least squares learning to (from) RE equilibria is strongly related
to stability (instability) of the associated o.d.e. β˙ = T (β) − β. Most of the
literature considers models where the mapping from perceived to actual expec-
tations does not depend on the change in perceptions, unlike in our case where
T depends on ∆βt. Since for large t the gain (αt)
−1 is very small, we have that
(23) implies ∆βt ≈ 0. One could thus think of the relevant mapping for conver-
gence in our paper as being T (·, 0) = a for all β. Asymptotically the T -map is
thus flat and the diﬀerential equation β˙ = T (β, 0) − β = a − β is stable. This
suggests that convergence to the RE equilibrium value β = a occurs and that
it should be very fast, so that one might then conclude that the model under
that if agents use it to update their posterior, it turns out to be the true likelihood of the
model in all periods. Since the ‘correct’ likelihood in each period depends on the way agents
learn, it would have to solve a complicated fixed point. Finding such a truly Bayesian learning
scheme is very diﬃcult and the question remains how agents could have learned a likelihood
that has such a special property. For these reasons Bray and Kreps (1987) concluded that
models of self-referential Bayesian learning were unlikely to be a fruitful avenue of research.
33 See Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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learning is likely to behave close to RE and there is not much to be gained from
introducing learning into the standard asset pricing model.34
The following result shows that the above considerations are partly correct
Convergence of OLS If βU > βRE , the learning scheme (23)-(24) of this
section satisfies
βt → a almost surely as t→∞
for any initial conditions α1 ≥ 1, β0 ∈
³
0, βU
´
.
The proof is in Appendix A.7, it requires some mild technical assumptions
on the support of ε. Note that we prove global convergence, while many results
in the literature on self-referential learning are about local convergence.
The learning model thus satisfies ‘Asymptotic Rationality’ as defined in sec-
tion III in Marcet and Nicolini (2003). It implies that agents using the learning
mechanism will realize in the long run that they are using the best possible fore-
cast, therefore, they would not have incentives to change their learning scheme
in the long run.
Yet, the remainder of this paper shows that our model behaves very diﬀerent
from RE during the transition to the limit. This occurs even though agents are
using an estimator that starts with strong confidence at the RE value, that
converges to the RE value, and that will be the best estimator in the long run.
The diﬀerence is so large that even this very simple version of the model together
with the very simple learning scheme introduced in section 3.1 qualitatively
matches the asset pricing facts much better than the model under RE.
3.2.3 Simulations
We now illustrate the previous discussion of the model under learning by re-
porting simulation results for certain parameter values. We compare outcomes
with the RE solution to show in what dimensions the behavior of the model
improves when learning is introduced.
We choose the parameter values for the dividend process (1) so as to match
the observed mean and standard deviation of US dividends:
a = 1.0035, s = 0.0298 (25)
We bias results in favor of the RE version of the model by choosing the discount
factor so that the RE model matches the average PD ratio we observe in the
data.35 This amounts to choosing
δ = 0.9877.
34That convergence ”should be fast” would follow from results in Marcet and Sargent (1995)
and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), showing that the asymptotic speed of convergence depends
on the size of T 0(βRE). Since in this model we have T 0(βRE) = 0 these results would seem
to indicate that convergence should be quite fast.
35This diﬀers from the latter part of the paper where we choose δ to match globally the
moments of interest.
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As we mentioned before, for the learning model we set β0 = a. We also choose
1/α1 = 0.02
These starting values are chosen to insure that the agents’ expectations will not
depart too much from rationality: initial beliefs are equal to the RE value and
the first quarterly observation of stock price growth obtains a weight of just
2%, with the remaining weight of 98% being placed on the RE ‘prior’. With
this value for α1 (and without shocks) it takes more than twelve years for βt
to converge half way from the initial RE value towards the observed sample
mean of stock price growth. Finally, we set the upper bound on βt so that the
quarterly PD ratio will never exceed UPD = 500.
Table 3 shows the moments from the data together with the corresponding
model statistics.36 The column labeled US data reports the statistics discussed
in section 2. It is clear from table 3 that the RE model fails to explain key asset
pricing moments. Consistent with our earlier discussion the RE equilibrium is
far away from explaining the volatility of asset prices and predictability of PD
ratio.37
US Data RE model Learning Model
Statistic
E(rs) 2.41 1.24 2.04
E(rb) 0.18 1.24 1.24
E(PD) 113.20 113.20 86.04
σrs 11.65 3.01 8.98
σPD 52.98 0.00 40.42
ρPD,−1 0.92 - 0.91
c21 -0.0008 - -0.0021
c23 -0.0023 - -0.0051
c25 -0.0048 - -0.0070
c210 -0.0219 - -0.0104
R21 0.0438 0.00 0.1647
R23 0.1196 0.00 0.2652
R25 0.1986 0.00 0.2735
R210 0.3285 0.00 0.3182
Table 3: Data and model under risk neutrality
Table 3 shows that introducing learning the model displays considerably
higher volatility of stock returns, high volatility and high persistence of the
36Throghout the paper we compute model statistics as follows: for each model we use 5000
realizations of 295 periods each, i.e., the same length as the available data. The reported
statistic is the average value of the statistics across simulations, which is a numerical approx-
imation to the expected value of the statistic for this sample size.
37 Since PD is constant under RE, the coeﬃcients c2s of the predictability regressions are
undefined under RE. This is not the case for the R2 values.
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PD ratio, and the coeﬃcients and R2 of the excess predictability regressions
all move strongly in the direction of the data. In particular, the model-implied
regression coeﬃcients become increasingly negative and the R2 of the regressions
increase with the forecast horizon. This is consistent with our earlier discussion
about the price dynamics implied by learning. Clearly, the statistics of the
learning model do not match the moments in the data quantitatively, but the
purpose of the table is to show that allowing for small departures from rationality
substantially improves the outcome. This is surprising, given that the model
adds only one free parameter (1/α1) relative to the RE model and that we
made no eﬀort to choose parameters to best match the moments in any way.
Additional simulations we conducted show that the qualitative improvements
provided by the model are very robust to changes in 1/α1, as long as it is neither
too small - in which case the model behaves as the RE model - nor too large -
in which case the model delivers too much volatility.
Table 3 also shows that the learning model delivers a positive equity pre-
mium. The equity premium is not the focus of the paper, but here we go some
way into explaining why the risk-neutral model delivers a risk premium. It
proves useful to re-express the gross stock return between period 0 and period
N as the product of three terms
NY
t=1
Pt +Dt
Pt−1
=
NY
t=1
Dt
Dt−1| {z }
=R1
·
µ
PDN + 1
PD0
¶
| {z }
=R2
·
N−1Y
t=1
PDt + 1
PDt| {z }
=R3
.
The first term (R1) is independent of the way expectations are formed, thus
it cannot contribute to explaining the emergence of an equity premium in the
learning model. The second term (R2) can potentially generate an equity pre-
mium if the terminal price dividend ratio in the learning model (PDN ) is on
average higher than under rational expectations.38 ,39 Yet, our simulations show
that the opposite is the case: under learning the terminal PD ratio in the sample
is lower (on average) than under rational expectations; this term thus generates
a negative premium under learning. The equity premium in Table 3 must thus
be due to the behavior of the last component (R3). This term gives rise to an
equity premium via a mean eﬀect and a volatility eﬀect.
If PD is on average low, this drives R3 up. Besides this mean eﬀect, there
exists also a volatility eﬀect, which emerges from the convexity of PDt+1PDt as
a function of the price dividend ratio. It implies that the equity premium is
higher under learning for models with a volatile PD. Since the price dividend
ratio has a higher variance than under rational expectations this contributes to
generate a risk premium under learning.40 The volatility eﬀect suggests that
38The value of PD0 is the same under learning and rational expectations since initial ex-
pectations in the learning model are set equal to the rational expectations value.
39The equity premium of Cogley and Sargent (2006) is due to this term.
40The data suggest that this convexity eﬀect is only moderately relevant: for the US data
1927:2-2000:4, it is at most 0.16% in quarterly real terms, thus explains about 8% of the equity
premium.
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the inability to match the variability of the price dividend ratio and the equity
premium are not independent facts and that models that generate insuﬃcient
variability of the price dividend ratio also tend to generate an insuﬃciently high
equity premium.
4 Baseline model with risk aversion
The remainder of the paper shows that the learning model can also quantitatively
account for the moments in the data, once we allow for moderate degrees of risk-
aversion, and that this finding is robust. Here we present the baseline model
with risk aversion, our simple baseline specification for the learning rule (OLS),
and the baseline calibration procedure. The quantitative results are discussed in
section 5, while section 6 illustrates the robustness of our quantitative findings
to a variety of changes in the learning rule and the calibration procedure.
4.1 Learning under risk aversion
We now present the baseline learning model with risk aversion and show that
the insights from the risk neutral model extend in a natural way to the case
with risk aversion.
The investor’s first-order conditions (3) together with the assumption that
agents know the conditional expectations of dividends deliver the stock pricing
equation under learning:41 ,42
Pt = δ eEtµµ DtDt+1
¶γ
Pt+1
¶
+ δEt
Ã
Dγt
Dγ−1t+1
!
(26)
To specify the learning model, in close analogy to the risk-neutral case, we
consider learning agents whose expectations in (26) are of the form
eEtµµ DtDt+1
¶γ
Pt+1
¶
= βtPt (27)
where βt denotes agents’ best estimate of E[(Dt/Dt+1)
γ (Pt+1/Pt)], i.e., their
expectations of risk-adjusted stock price growth. As implied by equation (6)
if βt = β
RE agents have rational expectations and if βt → βRE the learning
model will satisfy Asymptotic Rationality, where the expression for βRE is given
in equation (5).
As a baseline specification, we consider again the case where agents use OLS
to formulate their expectations of future (risk-adjusted) stock price growth
βt = βt−1 +
1
αt
∙µ
Dt−2
Dt−1
¶γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¸
(28)
41As in section 2, we impose the market clearing condition Ct = Dt and will associate
consumption with dividends in the data. This is not entirely innocuous as dividend growth in
the data is considerably more volatile than consumption growth. Section 6 will consider the
case Ct 6= Dt.
42Appendix A.2 shows how an overlapping generations model that implies equation (26).
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where the gain sequence 1/αt continues to be described by (24).
Again, in the spirit of allowing for only small deviations from rationality,
we restrict initial beliefs to be rational (β0 = β
RE). Appendix A.7 shows
that learning will cause beliefs to globally converge to RE, i.e., βt → βRE and¯¯
PREt − Pt
¯¯
→ 0 almost surely for any initial conditions β0 ∈
³
0, βU
´
, α1 ≥ 1.
The learning scheme thus satisfies Asymptotic Rationality.
For γ = 0 the setup above reduces to the risk-neutral model with learning
studied in section 3. For γ > 0 the setup is analogous to that under risk
neutrality, except that 1. the beliefs β now have an interpretation as risk-
adjusted stock price growth rather than simple stock price growth; 2. The risk-
adjustment factor (Dt−2/Dt−1)
γ now enters the belief updating formula (28).
Since for suﬃciently large γ the variance of realized risk-adjusted stock price
growth under RE increases with γ, the latter implies that larger risk aversion is
likely to generate more volatility in beliefs and, therefore, of actual prices under
learning.43 This will improve the ability of the learning model to match the
moments in the data.
As in the risk-neutral case we need to impose a projection facility to insure
that βt < δ
−1. To facilitate model calibration, described in the next section,
we change the projection facility slightly. The projection facility described be-
fore (and standard in the learning literature) introduces a discontinuity in the
simulated path. This makes it diﬃcult to search over the parameter space as
we will do in the next section. We assume instead that if βt is too high the
PD ratio (or, equivalently, adjusted beliefs) is given by an increasing, smooth
function of βt. The interpretation is either that individuals downplay observa-
tions that would entail too high a stock return (instead of completely ignoring
these observations, as in the standard projection facility), or that a government
agency intervenes if stock prices are too high and brings them down, but not
exactly to the value of last period’s PD ratio. This continuous projection facility
is, in a way, more natural, and it insures diﬀerentiability of the solution with
respect to parameter values, so that numerical searches over parameters that we
perform in the next two sections will be better behaved. Details are described
in appendix A.6.3. As before, the projection facility insures that the PD ratio
will never exceed a value of 500.
Finally, we show that beliefs continue to display momentum and mean-
reversion, similar to the case with risk-neutrality. Using equations (27), (26),
and the fact that Et
³
DγtD
1−γ
t+1
´
= βRE Dt shows that stock prices under learn-
43The variance of risk adjusted stock price growth under rational expectations is
V AR
??
Dt−2
Dt−1
?γ PREt−1
PREt−2
?
= a2(1−γ)e(−γ)(1−γ)
s2
2 (e(1−γ)
2s2 − 1)
This variance reaches a minimum for γ = 1 and it increases with γ for γ ≥ 1.
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ing are given by
Pt =
δβRE
1− δβt
Dt (29)
Pt
Pt−1
=
µ
1 +
δ ∆βt
1− δβt
¶
aεt (30)
From equations (28) and (30) follows that the expected dynamics of beliefs in
the risk averse model can be described by
Et−1∆βt+1 =
1
αt+1
¡
T (βt,∆βt)− βt−1
¢
(31)
where
T (βt,∆βt) ≡ βRE +
βREδ ∆βt
1− δβt
(32)
The updating equation (31) has the same structure as equation (22) and the
T-map (32) is identical to (20), which has been studied before only with βRE
in place of a. The implications regarding momentum and mean reversion from
section 3.1 thus directly apply to the expected belief dynamics in the model
with risk-aversion.
We conclude that, qualitatively, the main features of the model under learn-
ing are likely to remain after risk aversion is introduced, but that the model
now has an even larger chance to generate high volatility.
4.2 Baseline calibration procedure
This section describes and discusses our preferred calibration procedure. Recall
that the parameter vector of our baseline learning model is θ ≡ (δ, γ, 1/α1, a, s),
where δ is the discount factor, γ the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, α1 the
agents’ initial confidence in the rational expectations value, and a and s the
mean and standard deviation of dividend growth, respectively.
We choose the parameters (a, s) to match the mean and standard deviation
of dividend growth in the data, as in equation (25). Since it is our interest to
show that the model can match the volatility of stock prices for low levels of
risk aversion we fix γ = 5.
This leaves us with two free parameters (δ, 1/α1) and eight remaining asset
price statistics from table 1
bS 0 ≡ ³ bE(rs), bE(PD), bσrs , bσPD,bρPD,−1,bc52, bR25, bE(rb)´
where hatted variables indicate observed values as in the last column of Table
1. As discussed in detail in section 2, these statistics quantitatively capture the
asset pricing observations we seek to explain. Our aim is to show that there are
26
parameter values that make the model consistent with these moments.44
We could have proceeded further by fixing δ and/or 1/α1 to match some
additional moments exactly and use the remaining moments to test the model.
This is the usual practice in papers using calibration. Yet, many of these mo-
ments have a rather large standard deviation in the data, see the column labeled
”US Data std” in table 4 below. Related to this, the value of the moments can
vary a lot depending on the precise sample period used. For example, the mean
of the PD ratio would be estimated to be 99 using data up to 1996. Therefore,
matching any of these moments exactly appears arbitrary, one obtains rather
diﬀerent parameter values depending on which moment is chosen for calibration
and the sample period. For these reasons, we depart from the usual calibration
practice and choose the values for (δ, 1/α1) so as to fit all eight moments in the
vector bS as well as possible. Of course, it is a challenging task for the model to
match eight moments with just two parameters.
As in standard calibration exercises, we measure the goodness-of-fit using
the t-ratios bSi − eSi(θc)bσSi (33)
where bSi denotes the i-th sample moment observed in the data, eSi(θc) the
corresponding moment implied by the model at the calibrated parameter values
θc, and bσSi the estimated standard deviation of the moment. As in standard
calibration exercises, we conclude that the model’s fit is satisfactory if the t-
ratios are less than, say, two or three in absolute value. We choose the values
for (δ, 1/α1) that minimize the sum of squared t-ratios, where the sum is over
all eight moments. Therefore, moments with a larger standard deviation receive
less weight and are matched less precisely. Notice that the calibration result is
invariant to a potential rescaling of the moments. The details of the procedure
are defined and explained in appendix A.6.
In the calibration literature it is standard to set the estimate of the standard
deviation of the moments (bσSi in equation (33)) equal to the model implied
standard deviation of the considered moment. This practice has a number of
problems. First, it gives an incentive to the researcher to generate models with
high standard deviations, i.e., unsharp predictions, as these appear to improve
model fit because they artificially increase the denominator of the t-ratio; hence
the criterion of fit varies across models and a model with high variability will
artificially appear to be better. Second, to increase comparability with Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) we choose a model with a constant risk-free rate, so that
the model-implied standard deviation is bσE(rb) = 0. The above procedure would
then require to match the average risk free rate exactly, not because the data
suggests that this moment is known very precisely (it is not, see table 4), but
44Strictly speaking some of the elements of S are not ‘moments’, i.e., they are not a sample
average of some function of the data. The R-square coeﬃcient, for example, is a highly
non-linear function of moments, rather than being a moment itself. This generates some
slight technical problems discussed in appendix A.5. To be precise we should refer to ?S as
‘statistics’, but for simplicity we will proceed by refering to ?S as ‘moments ’.
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only as a result of the modelling strategy.
To avoid all these problems we prefer to find an estimate of the standard
deviation of each statistic bσSi that is based purely on data sources. This has the
additional advantage that bσSi is constant across alternative models and thereby
allows for model comparisons in a meaningful way. We show in appendix A.6
how to obtain consistent estimates of these standard deviations from the data.
With these estimates we use these resulting t-ratios as our measure of ‘fit’ for
each sample statistic and claim to have a good fit if this ratio is below two or
three.
The procedure just described is in some ways close to estimation by the
method of simulated moments (MSM), and using the t-ratios as measures of
fit may appear like using test statistics. In appendix A.6 we describe how
this interpretation would be correct under some additional assumptions and
appealing to asymptotic theory, but we do not wish to interpret our procedure
as a formal econometric method.45
Finally, since many economists feel uncomfortable with discount factors
larger than 1, we restrict the search to δ ≤ 1.We relax this constraint in section
6.
In summary, we think of the method just described as a way to pick the para-
meters (δ, 1/α1) in a systematic way, such that the model has a good chance to
meet the data, but where the model could also easily be rejected since there are
many more moments than parameters, and where the fit criterion is analogous
to the one used in the literature on MSM and calibration.
5 Quantitative results
We now evaluate the quantitative performance of the baseline learning model
(using OLS and γ = 5) using the baseline calibration approach described in the
previous section.
Our results are summarized in table 4 below. The second and third column
of the table report, respectively, the asset pricing moments from the data that
we seek to match and the standard deviation for each moment estimated with
data sources alone using the procedure described in appendix A.6. Using the
notation of the previous section the second column reports bSi and the third
column bσSi . The table shows that some of the moments are estimated rather
imprecisely.
The calibrated parameters values of the learning model are reported at the
bottom of the table. Notice that the gain parameter 1/α1 is small, reflecting
the tendency of the data to give large (but less than full) weight to the RE prior
about stock price growth. As has been explained before, high values of 1/α1
45This is because the distribution of the parameters and test statistics for these formal esti-
mation methods relies on asymptotics, but asymptotically our baseline least squares learning
model is indistinguishable from RE. Therefore, one would have to rely on short-sample distri-
bution of statistics. Developing such distributions is well beyond the scope of this paper. This
is less of a problem in the constant gain exercises below, since the model does not converge,
so it is possible to use MSM for this learning algorithm if one relies on asymptotics.
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would cause beliefs to be very volatile and give rise to too much volatility, this is
why the calibration procedure chooses a low value for 1/α1. The calibrated gain
reported in the table implies that when updating beliefs in the initial period,
the RE prior receives a weight of approximately 98.5% and the first quarterly
observation a weight of about 1.5%. The discount factor is quite high.
US Data Model (OLS)
Statistics std t-ratio
E(rs) 2.41 0.45 2.41 0.01
E(rb) 0.18 0.23 0.48 -1.30
E(PD) 113.20 15.15 95.93 1.14
σrs 11.65 2.88 13.21 -0.54
σPD 52.98 16.53 62.19 -0.56
ρPD,−1 0.92 0.02 0.94 -1.20
c25 -0.0048 0.002 -0.0067 0.92
R25 0.1986 0.083 0.3012 -1.24
Parameters: δ = .999, 1/α1 = 0.015
Table 4: Moments and parameters.
Baseline model and baseline calibration
The fourth column in table 4 reports the moments implied by the calibrated
learning model and the fifth column the corresponding t-ratios. The learning
model performs remarkably well. In particular, the model with risk aversion
maintains the high variability and serial correlation of the PD ratio and the
variability of stock returns, as in section 3. In addition, it now succeeds in
matching the mean of the PD ratio and it also matches the equity premium quite
well. As discussed in section 2 it is natural that the excess return regressions can
be explained reasonably well once the serial correlation of the PD is matched.
Clearly, the point estimate of some model moments does not match exactly
the observed moment in the data, but this tends to occur for moments that, in
the short sample, have a large variance. This is shown in the last column of
table 4 which reports the goodness-of-fit measures (t-ratios) for each considered
moment. The t-ratios are all well below two and thus well within what is
a 95% confidence interval, if this was a formal econometric test. Notice in
particular that the calibration procedure chooses a value of δ that implies a
risk-free interest rate that is more than twice as large as the point estimate in
the data. Since the standard deviation of bE(rb), reported in the third column
of Table 4, is fairly large, one nevertheless obtains a low t-ratio.
In summary, the results of table 4 show that introducing learning substan-
tially improves the fit of the model relative to the case with RE and is overall
very successful in quantitatively accounting for the empirical evidence described
in section 2. We find this result remarkable, given that we used the simplest
version of the asset pricing model and combined it with the simplest available
learning mechanism.
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6 Robustness
This section shows that the quantitative performance of the model is robust
to a number of extensions. We start by exploring alternative learning schemes,
then we consider a diﬀerent model, and finally we discuss alternative calibration
procedures.
Learning about dividends. In the baseline model we assume agents
know the conditional expectation of dividends. This was done to simplify the
exposition and because learning about dividends has been considered in pre-
vious papers.46 Since it may appear inconsistent to assume that agents know
the dividend growth process but do not know how to forecast stock prices, we
consider a model where agents learn simultaneously about dividend growth and
stock price growth. In appendix A.5 we lay out the model and show that, while
the analysis is more involved, the basic results do not change. Table 5 below
shows the quantitative results with learning about dividends using the baseline
calibration procedure described in section 5. It shows that introducing dividend
learning does not lead to significant changes.
Constant gain learning. An undesirable feature of the OLS learning
scheme is that volatility of stock prices decreases over time, which may seem
counterfactual. Therefore, we depart from OLS and introduce a learning scheme
with a constant gain, where the weight on the forecast error in the learning
scheme is constant: αt = α1 for all t.47 Beliefs then respond to forecast errors
in the same way throughout the sample and stock price volatility does not
decrease at the end of the sample period. As discussed extensively in the learning
literature, such a learning scheme improves forecasting performance when there
are changes in the environment. Agents who suspect the existence of switches
in the average growth rate of prices or fundamentals, for example, may be
reasonably expected to use a constant gain learning scheme. Table 5 reports the
quantitative results for the constant gain model using the baseline calibration
approach. For obvious reasons, stock prices are now more volatile, even if the
initial gain is substantially lower than in the baseline case. Overall, the fit of the
model is very good.48 Figure 3 depicts three typical realizations of the PD ratio
using the calibrated parameters. It illustrates that, similar to the actual data,
stock prices in the model have a tendency to display sustained price increases
that are followed by rather sharp price reductions.
46E.g., Timmermann (1993, 1996).
47The derivations for this model are as in section 4 and require only changing the evolution
of α.
48We do not use constant gain as our main learning scheme because βt does then not
converge, i.e., we loose asymptotic rationality. Nevertheless, in a setup where there are trend
switches in fundamentals, constant gain agents’ forecasts will perform better than OLS. We
leave this for future research.
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Figure 3: Simulated PD ratio from the estimated constant gain model (table 5)
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Switching weights. We now introduce a learning model in which the gain
switches over time, as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003).49 The idea is to combine
constant gain with OLS, using the former in periods where a large forecast error
occurs and the latter when the forecast error is low. We report the quantitative
results in Table 5, which are very similar to those with pure constant gain
learning. The latter occurred because the model was frequently in ‘constant
gain mode’.
US Data Learning on Div. Constant gain Switching weights
Statistic t-ratio t-ratio t-ratio
E(rs) 2.41 2.41 0.00 2.26 0.34 2.25 0.36
E(rb) 0.18 0.48 -1.29 0.44 -1.11 0.44 -1.11
E(PD) 113.20 96.17 1.12 109.82 0.22 110.00 0.21
σrs 11.65 13.23 -0.55 14.55 -1.00 14.51 -0.99
σPD 52.98 62.40 -0.57 74.60 -1.31 74.50 -1.30
ρPD,−1 0.92 0.94 -1.22 0.94 -0.81 0.94 -0.82
c25 -0.0048 -0.0067 0.96 -0.0059 0.5344 -0.0059 0.5308
R25 0.1986 0.2982 -1.20 0.2443 -0.5516 0.2454 -0.5650
Parameters:
δ 0.999 1 1
1/α1 0.015 0.00628 0.00626
Table 5: Robustness, Part I
Consumption data. Throughout the paper we made the simplifying as-
sumption of equating consumption with dividends (Ct = Dt). Then we cali-
brated this process to dividend data because when studying stock price volatil-
ity the data on dividends has to be brought out. However, it is well known
that consumption growth is much less volatile than dividend growth, so that
these two choices are likely to help in explaining volatility and risk premium.
Therefore, we now allow for C 6= D and calibrate the volatility of the consump-
tion and dividend processes separately to the data. While the dividends process
remains as before, we set
Ct+1
Ct
= aεct+1 for ln ε
c
t ∼ iiN
µ
−s
2
c
2
; s2c
¶
The presence of two shocks modifies the equations for the RE version of the
model in a well known way and we do not describe it in detail here.50 We
calibrate the consumption process following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and
we set sc = s7 and ρ(ε
c
t , εt) = .2 .
51
49The advantage of using switching gains, relative to using simple constant gain, is that
under certain conditions, the learning model converges to RE, i.e., Asymptotic Rationality is
preserved, while the learning scheme still reacts quickly if there is a change in the environment.
50Obviously, this would require replacing U 0(Dt) by U 0(Ct) in equation (2).
51We take these ratios and values from table 1 in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), which is
based on a slightly shorter sample than the one used in this paper.
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The quantitative results are reported in table 6 below, which shows that
we do not fit the data as well as before and, in particular, for the calibrated
parameters we do not match the risk-free rate. Equivalently, one could say that
this simulation does not match the risk premium puzzle. We do not wish to
make much of this quasi-rejection: first, it was not the objective of this paper to
match perfectly all moments, second, the equity premium is not the main focus
of this paper, one would have added a number of other features in the model
if the objective would be to fit the risk premium. Furthermore, to a rational
expectations fundamentalist, who would dismiss models of learning from the
outset as being ”non rigorous because they can always match any data”, this
shows that this is not always the case. One way to improve the fit of this model
is considered below when we relax the constraint on δ.
Full weighting matrix from method of simulated moments We now
investigate the robustness of our findings to changes in the calibration procedure.
In an econometric MSM setup, one would have to find the parameters that
minimize a quadratic form with a certain optimal weighting matrix, while our
baseline calibration amounted to using a diagonal weighting matrix with bσ−2Si
in the diagonal. Therefore, a more econometrically-oriented reader will think
that the objective function to be minimized in the baseline calibration is not
justified. For details see the discussion around equation (57) in appendix A.6.
Table 6 shows the results when we use the optimal weighting matrix in MSM.
We still obtain a good fit, the estimated confidence in initial beliefs is high.
Some moments are matched less well, for example, the serial correlation of the
PD ratio. This is natural since the weighting matrix does not bring down the
t-ratios per se.
US Data C 6= D OLS, Full matrix
Statistics t-ratio t-ratio
E(rs) 2.41 2.36 0.12 2.12 0.64
E(rb) 0.18 1.76 -6.91 0.44 -1.11
E(PD) 113.20 63.56 3.28 102.43 0.71
σrs 11.65 8.42 1.12 11.88 -0.08
σPD 52.98 30.14 1.38 61.07 -0.49
ρPD,−1 0.92 0.91 0.49 0.96 -1.94
c25 -0.0048 -0.0073 1.2410 -0.0060 0.6207
R25 0.1986 0.2641 -0.7911 0.3322 -1.6127
Parameters:
δ 1 1
1/α1 0.0178 0.0128
Table 6: Robustness, Part II
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Relaxing constraint on δ The attentive reader will have noticed that
the constraint δ ≤ 1 of the baseline calibration is binding in many of the cases
considered in tables 5 and 6. It turns out that this restriction is unnecessary
because risk aversion causes agents to discount future dividends more heavily.
As a result, the discounted sum of dividends can be finite even if δ > 1.52
Table 7 below shows how the model improves when δ is estimated without this
constraint and the only constraints are that a rational expectations PD exists
and it is below the price implied by βL, where the diﬀerentiable projection
facility starts to operate.53 To save on space we only report the constant gain
and C 6= D models. Obviously, the fit of the model improves. In the case
of constant gain, which already performed very well, there is not much room
for improvement. The C 6= D model now sustains a lower interest rate, with
a t-ratio close to three, so that the equity premium is now much larger. We
conclude that this model fits the data well.
Model-generated standard deviations As a final exercise we demon-
strate the robustness of our finding to using t-ratios based on model-generated
standard deviations. This is the preferred approach in most calibration exer-
cises. Again, the fit of the model is quite good.54
US Data C 6= D Constant gain Model bσSi
Statistics t-ratio t-ratio t-ratio
E(rs) 2.41 2.01 0.89 2.26 0.34 2.28 0.52
E(rb) 0.18 0.84 -2.89 0.31 -0.55 0.31 –
E(PD) 113.20 112.85 0.02 110.46 0.18 111.05 0.12
σrs 11.65 10.43 0.42 14.77 -1.08 16.53 -1.40
σPD 52.98 61.16 -0.49 75.41 -1.36 77.04 -2.10
ρPD,−1 0.92 0.95 -1.43 0.94 -0.84 0.94 -0.77
c25 -0.0048 -0.0089 2.0440 -0.0059 0.5622 -0.0061 1.5195
R25 0.1986 0.2397 -0.4966 0.2412 -0.5151 0.2306 -0.6420
Parameters:
δ 1.00906 1.000375 1.0013
1/α1 0.0244 0.0063 0.0065
Table 7: Robustness, Part III, δ unrestricted
52More precisely, in the context of the above simple model, it is obvious from (4) and (5)
that all that is needed in order to have a finite price under RE is that δ <
?
βRE
?−1
, and since
risk aversion can bring βRE below 1 this allows for δ > 1. For a discussion, see Kocherlakota
(1990).
53 See appendix A.6.3 for details.
54For this case δ is chosen to match ?E
?
rb
?
as closely as possible subject to the constraint
PDRE < PDL where PDL is the price dividend ratio implied by βL, see appendix A.6.3 for
details. It turns out that in this column the constraint is binding, so that one cannot match
the real interest rate exactly.
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The previous robustness exercises allowed for deviations from the baseline
model and calibration. We found the results to be very robust and that the
model continues to be able to explain the moments surprisingly well.
7 Conclusions and Outlook
A one parameter learning extension of a very simple asset pricing model strongly
improves the ability of the model to quantitatively account for a number of
asset pricing facts, even with moderate degrees of risk aversion. This outcome
is remarkable, given the diﬃculties documented in the empirical asset pricing
literature in accounting for these facts. The diﬃculties of rational expectations
models suggest that learning processes may be more relevant for explaining
empirical phenomena than previously thought.
While we relax the assumption of rational expectations, the learning scheme
used here is a small deviation from full rationality. Introducing learning in
the model amounts to adding only one new parameter in a basic model. It
is surprising, therefore, that such a large improvement in the fit of the data
can be achieved. Indeed, it seems that the most convincing case for models
of learning can be made by explaining facts that appear ‘puzzling’ from the
rational expectations viewpoint, as we attempt to do in this paper.
The simple setup presented in this paper could be extended in a number of
interesting ways and also applied to study other substantive questions on stock
prices. One avenue that we currently explore is to ask whether learning processes
can account also for the otherwise puzzling behavior of exchange rates. Clearly,
the ability of simple models of learning to explain puzzling empirical phenomena
in more than one market would further increase confidence in that learning-
induced small deviations from rationality are indeed economically relevant.
A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
Our data is for the United States and has been downloaded from ‘The Global
Financial Database’ (http://www.globalfinancialdata.com). The period covered
is 1925:4-2005:4. For the subperiod 1925:4-1998:4 our data set corresponds very
closely to Campbell’s (2003) data (http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~campbell/data.html).
In the calibration part of the paper we use moments that are based on the
same number of observations. Since we seek to match the return predictability
evidence at the five year horizon (c25 and R
2
5) we can only use data points up to
2000:4. For consistency the eﬀective sample end for all other moments reported
in table 1 has been shortened by five years to 2000:4. In addition, due to the
seasonal adjustment procedure for dividends described below and the way we
compute the standard errors for the moments described in appendix A.6, the
eﬀective starting date was 1927:2.
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To obtain real values, nominal variables have been deflated using the ‘USA
BLS Consumer Price Index’ (Global Fin code ‘CPUSAM’). The monthly price
series has been transformed into a quarterly series by taking the index value of
the last month of the considered quarter.
The nominal stock price series is the ‘SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD
extension)’ (Global Fin code ‘_SPXD’). The weekly (up to the end of 1927) and
daily series has been transformed into quarterly data by taking the index value
of the last week/day of the considered quarter. Moreover, the series has been
normalized to 100 in 1925:4.
As nominal interest rate we use the ‘90 Days T-Bills Secondary Market’
(Global Fin code ‘ITUSA3SD’). The monthly (up to the end of 1933), weekly
(1934-end of 1953), and daily series has been transformed into a quarterly se-
ries using the interest rate corresponding to the last month/week/day of the
considered quarter and is expressed in quarterly rates, i.e., not annualized.
Nominal dividends have been computed as follows
Dt =
µ
ID(t)/ID(t− 1)
IND(t)/IND(t− 1) − 1
¶
IND(t)
where IND denotes the ‘SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)’
described above and ID is the ‘SP 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension)’
(Global Fin code ‘_SPXTRD ’). We first computed monthly dividends and
then quarterly dividends by adding up the monthly series. Following Campbell
(2003), dividends have been deseasonalized by taking averages of the actual
dividend payments over the current and preceding three quarters.
A.2 OLG foundations
This appendix derives the asset pricing equations (9) and (26) analyzed in the
main text from an overlapping generations (OLG) model. Specifically, the ap-
pendix shows that these equations are first order conditions implied by utility
maximizing agents that hold a consistent (but not necessarily rational) set of
beliefs. It also shows that - unless investors possess a considerable amount of
additional information - agents’ beliefs about prices fail to be determined by
their beliefs about the dividend process.
Consider an OLG model with constant population and cohorts living for two
periods. Each cohort consists of a unit mass of identical representative agents.
Young agents own one unit of productive time and inelastically supply it to
work. Old agents do not work but consume their savings. Agents’ preferences
are given by
X1−γt
1− γ + δ
Y 1−γt+1
1− γ (34)
whereX denotes consumption when young and Y consumption when old. There
is a unit mass of firms (Lucas trees) producing the consumption good. Each
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agent of the initial old generation owns one of those firms. Every period, old
agents operate the firm by hiring labor, producing, paying wages and consuming
the profits/dividends. In addition, they sell the firm to the new generation. All
markets are competitive. Firms’ production function is
AtN
α
t
with α ∈ (0, 1) and Nt denoting labor input. There is no entry of firms (trees)
and due to decreasing returns there will be profits/dividends in equilibrium.
Total factor productivity follows
At+1 = aAtεt+1
Investors face the following budget constraint
Xt + P
b
t Bt + StPt =Wt + Ft (35)
Yt+1 = Bt + St(Pt+1 +Dt+1) +Gt+1 (36)
where St denotes the number of stocks/firms owned by the consumer, Bt real
bond holdings, Pt the real (ex-dividend) price of the stock, P bt the real price of
bonds, Wt the real wage/labor income, and Ft and Gt+1 additional exogenous
endowments of the consumption good. For simplicity, we assume
Ft = φAt
Gt+1 = φAt+1
for some φ ≥ 0.55 Households maximize the expected value of (34) subject to
(35) and (36), given their beliefs about the future values of (Pt+1,Dt+1, Gt+1).
Since we do not require these beliefs to be rational, we denote the expectations
operator induced by these beliefs by eEt [·].
We now derive the optimality and market clearing conditions and show that
these imply the asset pricing equations analyzed in the main text. Profit maxi-
mization by firms implies
αAtN
α−1
t =Wt
and the household’s optimality conditions are given by
P bt x
−σ
t = δ eEt ¡y−σt+1¢ (37)
Ptx
−σ
t = δ eEt ¡y−σt+1 (Pt+1 +Dt+1)¢ (38)
Clearing of bond and stock markets requires
Bt = 0
St = 1
55These endowments could be generated by additional inelastic labor supply and the pres-
ence of firms that operate the constant returns to scale technology αAtNt. Since these firms
generate zero profits, one can abstract from ownership.
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while clearing of labor and goods markets implies
Nt = 1
Xt + Yt = At + Ft +Gt
Labor market clearing and firm optimality deliver
αAt =Wt (39)
showing that profits/dividends are
Dt = (1− α)At (40)
Dividends thus follow the process assumed in the main text, provided the initial
productivity level is appropriately scaled to match the initial level of dividends.
Assuming φ suﬃciently large, i.e., that dividends make up only a small
share of old age consumption, and using the budget constraints, the market
clearing conditions, and equations (39) and (40), allows to make the following
approximation
Yt+1
Xt
=
At+1
At
=
Dt+1
Dt
The asset pricing equation (38) then simplifies to
Pt = δ eEtÃµDt+1Dt
¶−σ
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
!
(41)
which is identical to equation (26) in the main text and equal to (9) for σ = 0.
Except for equation (37) which prices short-term bonds, equation (41) is the only
restriction implied by household optimality. Therefore, individual rationality
does not imply that beliefs about the dividend process impose restrictions on
agents’ beliefs about the price process, and in particular agents’ beliefs about
price need not be consistent with their beliefs about the discounted sum of
dividends. To obtain the latter, investors have to know a lot more. Specifically,
they need to know
• that assets in future periods are priced by an equation corresponding to
equation (41),
• that they can safely apply the law of iterated expectations to formulate ex-
pectations about the expectations of future generations, i.e., eEt h eEt+j [·]i =eEt [·] for all j > 0, and
• that the limiting condition limj→∞ eEt ∙δj ³ Dt+jDt+j−1´−σ Pt+j¸ = 0 is valid.
Knowing the previous allows agents to iterate on (41) so as to derive
Pt = eEt
⎛
⎝
∞X
j=1
δj
µ
Dt+j
Dt+j−1
¶−σ
Dt+j
⎞
⎠
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which shows that beliefs about the price process are then determined by agents’
beliefs about the dividend process.
A.3 Proof of mean reversion
To prove mean reversion for the general learning scheme of (16) we need the
following additional technical assumptions on the updating function ft:
Assumption 1 There is a η > 0 such that ft is diﬀerentiable in the interval
(−η, η) and, letting
Dt ≡ inf
∆∈(−η,η)
∂ft(∆)
∂∆
,
we have ∞X
t=0
Dt =∞
This is satisfied by all the learning mechanisms considered in this paper and
by most algorithms used in the stochastic control literature. For example, it
is guaranteed in the OLS case Dt = 1/(t + α1) and constant gain where Dt =
1/α1 for all t. If the assumption fails and
PDt < ∞, then beliefs get ‘stuck’
away from the fundamental value simply because updating of beliefs ceases to
incorporate new information for t large enough. In this case convergence can
not occur, and agents make systematic mistakes forever. One could thus claim
that algorithms with
PDt <∞ are not satisfactory learning schemes. We also
need:
Assumption 2 a) Dt ≥ 0 for all t; b) β0 ∈
³
0, βU
´
; c) the learning rule
satisfies f(−z) ≥ −z for all z ∈
h
0, βU
i
.
Assumptions 2 b) and c) insure that βt ≥ 0 for all t, i.e., that agents predict
future stock prices to be non-negative. This together with 2 a) insures that
actual stock prices are indeed always non-negative. Note that OLS and constant
gain learning satisfy 2 c) for α1 ≥ 1, as is assumed throughout the paper.
Clearly, we have 0 ≤ βt ≤ βU for all t.
We start proving mean reversion for the case βt > a. Fix η > 0 small enough
that η < min(η, (βt − a)/2) where η is as in assumption 1.
We first prove that there exists a finite t0 ≥ t such that
∆β?t ≥ 0 for all et such that t < et < t0, and (42)
∆βt0 < 0 (43)
To prove this, choose  = η
³
1− δβU
´
. It cannot be that ∆β?t ≥ ² for allet > t, since  > 0 and this would contradict the bound β?t ≤ βU . Therefore
∆βt < ² for some finite t ≥ t. Take t ≥ t to be the first period where ∆βt < ².
There are two possible cases: either i) ∆βt < 0 or ii) ∆βt ≥ 0.
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In case i) we have (42) and (43) hold if we take t0 = t.
In case ii) βt can not decrease between t and t so that
βt ≥ βt > a+ η
Furthermore, we have
T (βt,∆βt) = a+
∆βt
1− δβt
< a+
²
1− δβt
< a+
²
1− δβU
= a+ η
where the first equality follows from the definition of T , the first inequality uses
∆βt < ² and the second inequality that βt < β
U and the last equality follows
from the choice for ². The previous two relations imply
βt > T (βt,∆βt)
This together with (22) and the properties for ft gives
βt + ft+1 (T (βt,∆βt)− βt) < βt < βU
so that the projection facility does not apply at t+ 1. Therefore
∆βt+1 = ft+1 (T (βt,∆βt)− βt) < 0
Therefore in case ii) we have that (42) and (43) hold for t0 = t+ 1.
This shows that (42) and (43) hold for a finite t0. Now we need to show that
from then on beliefs decrease and, eventually, they go below a+ η.
First, notice that given any j ≥ 0, if
∆β
t0+j < 0 and (44)
β
t0+j > a+ η (45)
then
∆βt0+j+1 = ft0+j+1
µ
a+
∆βt0+j
1− δβt0+j
− βt0+j
¶
< ft0+j+1
¡
a− βt0+j
¢
(46)
< ft0+j+1 (−η) ≤ −ηDt0+j+1 ≤ 0 (47)
where the first inequality follows from (44), the second inequality from (45) and
the third from the mean value theorem and Dt0+j+1 ≥ 0. Assume, towards a
contradiction, that (45) holds for all j ≥ 0. Since (44) holds for j = 0, it follows
by induction that ∆βt0+j ≤ 0 for all j ≥ 0 and, therefore, that (47) would hold
for all j ≥ 0. This would imply
βt0+j =
jX
i=1
∆βt0+i + βt0 ≤ −η
jX
i=1
Dt0+i + βt0
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for all j > 0. Assumption 1 above would then imply βt → −∞ showing that
(45) can not hold for all j. Therefore there is a finite j such that βt0+j will go
below a+ η and β is decreasing from t0 until it goes below a+ η.
For the case βt < a − η we need to make the additional assumption that
βU > a. Then, choosing ² = η we can use a symmetric argument to make the
proof.
A.4 Details on the phase diagram
The second order diﬀerence equation (22) describing the deterministic evolution
of beliefs allows to construct non-linear first-order learning dynamics in the¡
βt, βt−1
¢
plane. For clarity, we define x0t ≡ (x1,t, x2,t) ≡
¡
βt, βt−1
¢
, whose
dynamics are given by
xt+1 =
Ã
x1,t + ft+1
³
a+ aδ(x1,t−x2,t)1−δx1,t − x1,t
´
x1,t
!
The points in the phase diagram where there is no change are the following: we
have ∆x2 = 0 at points x1 = x2, so that the 45o line gives the point of no change
in x2, and ∆x2 > 0 above this line. We have ∆x1 = 0 for x2 = 1δ −
x1(1−δx1)
aδ ,
this is the curve labelled ”βt+1 = βt” in Figure 2 and ∆x1 > 0 below this
curve. So the zeroes for ∆x1 and ∆x2 intersect are at x1 = x2 = a which is the
REE and, interestingly, at x1 = x2 = δ
−1 which is the limit of rational bubble
equilibria. These results give rise to the phase diagram shown in figure 2.
A.5 Model with learning about dividends
This section considers agents who learn to forecast future dividends in addition
to forecast future price. We make the arguments directly for the general model
with risk aversion from section 4. Equation (26) then becomes
Pt = δ eEtµµ CtCt+1
¶γ
Pt+1
¶
+ δ eEtÃ Dγt
Dγ−1t+1
!
Under RE one has
Et
Ã
Dγt
Dγ−1t+1
!
= Et
Ã
D1−γt+1
D−γt
!
= Et
Ãµ
Dt+1
Dt
¶1−γ!
Dt
= Et
³
(aε)1−γ
´
Dt
= βREDt
This justifies that learning agents will forecast future dividends according to
eEtÃD1−γt+1
D−γt
!
= ϕtDt
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where ϕt is agents’s best estimate of eEtµ³Dt+1Dt ´1−γ¶, which can be interpreted
as risk-adjusted dividend-growth. In close analogy to the learning setup for
future price we assume that agents’ estimate evolves according to
ϕt = ϕt−1 +
1
αt
Ãµ
Dt−1
Dt−2
¶1−γ
− ϕt−1
!
(48)
which can be given a proper Bayesian interpretation. In the spirit of allowing
for only small deviations from rationality, we assume that the initial belief is
correct
ϕ0 = β
RE .
Moreover, the gain sequence αt is the same as the one used for updating the
estimate for βt. Learning about βt remains to be described by equation (28).
With these assumptions realized price and price growth are given by
Pt =
δϕt
1− δβt
Dt
Pt
Pt−1
=
ϕt
ϕt−1
µ
1 +
δ4βt
1− δβt
¶
aεt
The map T from perceived to actual expectations of the risk-adjusted price
growth Pt+1Pt
³
Dt
Dt+1
´γ
in this more general model is given by
T (βt+1,∆βt+1) ≡
ϕt+1
ϕt
Ã
βRE +
βREδ ∆βt+1
1− δβt+1
!
(49)
which diﬀers from (32) only by the factor
ϕt+1
ϕt
. From (48) it is clear that
ϕt+1
ϕt
evolves exogenously and that limt→∞
ϕt+1
ϕt
= 1 since limt→∞ ϕt = β
RE and
αt → ∞. Thus, for medium to high values of αt and initial beliefs not too far
from the RE value, the T-maps with and without learning about dividends are
very similar.
For the deterministic setting with risk-neutrality considered in section 3, one
has ϕt = ϕ0 = a and β
RE = a so that (49) becomes identical to (20).
A.6 Calibration procedure
This section describes the details of our calibration approach and explains how
we estimate the standard deviation of the sample statistics reported in table 4.
Let N be the sample size, (y1, ...yN ) the observed data sample, with yt
containing m variables. In the text we referred to all data statistics we used
as ”moments” even though this is not exactly correct (see footnote 44). In this
section we have to distinguish between proper moments and functions of these
moments, to which we just refer as statistics
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We consider the sample statistics S(MN ) which are a function of the sample
moment MN . Here S : Rq → Rs is a statistic function that maps moments
into the considered statistics. For a given function h : Rm → Rq, the sample
moments on which our statistics are based are defined as MN ≡ 1N
PN
t=1 h(yt).
The explicit expressions for h(·) and S(·) for our particular application are stated
in A.6.1 below.
In the main text we have denoted the observed sample statistics as bS ≡
S(MN ).
We now explain how we compute the corresponding model statistics for a
given model parameterization θ ∈ Rn. Let ωs denote a realization of shocks
and (y1(θ, ωs), ...yN (θ, ωs)) the random variables corresponding to a history of
length N generated by the model for shock realization ωs. Furthermore, let
MN (θ, ω
s) ≡ 1
N
NX
t=1
h(yt(θ, ω
s))
denote the model moment for realization ωs and
S(MN (θ, ωs))
the corresponding model statistics for this realization. The model statistics
we wish to report are the expected value of the statistic across possible shock
realizations and for a sample size N :eS(θ) ≡ E [S(MN (θ, ωs))]
One can obtain a numerical approximation to the theoretical model statisticeS(θ) by averaging (for a given a parameter vector θ) across a large number of
simulations of length N the statistics S(MN (θ, ωs)) implied by each simulation.
We report this average in the tables of the main text.
Now that we have explained how to compute statistics in the data and the
model, we explain how we calibrate the parameters so as to match the model
statistics to the statistics of the data. Let bSi = Si(MN ) denote the i-th statistic
from the data and let bσSi be an estimate for the standard deviation of the i-th
statistic. How we obtain bσSi will be explained in detail below. The baseline
parameter choice bθN is then found as follows
bθN ≡ argmin
θ
sX
i=1
Ã bSi − eSi(θ)bσSi
!2
(50)
subject to the restrictions on the parameters described in the text, that is, a, s
are given by (25), δ ≤ 1, and γ = 5. Our procedure thus tries to match the
model statistics as closely as possible to the data statistics, but gives less weight
to statistics with a larger standard deviation. Notice that the calibration result
is invariant to a rescaling of the variables of interest. Of course, the number of
parameters should be less than the number of statistics s. In order to avoid a
certain singularity it will be required, in addition, that s ≤ q.
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In order to solve the minimization problem (50) with standard numerical
procedures we slightly modify the projection facility described in (16) to insure
that the objective function in (50) is continuously diﬀerentiable. Appendix A.6.3
describes this in detail.
We now explain how we obtain the estimate for the standard deviation of
the i-th statistic bσSi . We start by discussing desirable asymptotic properties of
such an estimate and then explain how it has been constructed.
We would like to have an estimator bσSi that converges to the standard
deviation of the statistic suﬃciently fast, so that asymptotically the t-ratio
has a standard normal distribution. More precisely, assuming stationarity, let
M0 = E [h(yt(θ0, ωs))] denote the theoretical moment at the true parameter
value, we require
√
N
bSi − Si(M0)bσSi → N (0, 1) in distribution (51)
as N →∞ . Once we have such an estimator bσSi , it is justified to interpret t-
ratios as goodness of fit measures that should be below two or three in absolute
value.
For this purpose we find an estimate for the full covariance matrix bΣS,N of
model statistics from a sample of N observations such thatbΣS,N → ΣS almost surely, for (52)√
N [S(MN )− S(M0)]→ N (0,ΣS) (53)
as N →∞. Then, taking bσ2Si in (50) to be the diagonal entries of bΣS,N insures
that (51) is satisfied, as required. Now we need to build bΣS,N that satisfies
(52). For this purpose we first find an expression for ΣS under some additional
assumptions.
Assume y to be stationary and ergodic, S to be continuously diﬀerentiable
at M0, and that the matrix
Sw ≡
∞X
j=−∞
E
£
(h(yt)−M0) (h(yt−j)−M0)0
¤
(54)
is finite. We then have ΣS in (52) given by
ΣS =
∂S(M0)
∂M 0
Sw
∂S 0(M0)
∂M
(55)
This follows from standard arguments: by the mean value theorem
√
N [S(M0)− S(MN )] = ∂S(MN )∂M 0
√
N [M0 −MN ] (56)
whereMN is a certain convex combination ofMN andM0.56 Under stationarity
and ergodicity of y, we have MN →M0 a.s. by the ergodic theorem. Since MN
56As is well known, a diﬀerent MN is needed for each row of S but this issue is inconse-
quential for the proof and we ignore it here.
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is between MN and M0, this implies MN → M0 a.s. and, since ∂S(·)∂M 0 has been
assumed continuous at M0 we have that
∂S(MN )
∂M 0
→ ∂S(M0)
∂M 0
a.s.
From the central limit theorem
√
N (M0 −MN )→ N (0, Sw) in distribution
Plugging the previous two relationships into (56) shows that if ΣS is given by
(55) then (53) holds and, therefore the t-ratio have a standard normal limiting
distribution.
Given the expression that we have found for Σ we have that given an estimate
Sw,N that converges a.s. to Sw we can use as our estimator
bΣS,N ≡ ∂S(MN )∂M 0 Sw,N ∂S 0(MN)∂M
An explicit expression for ∂S(MN )/∂M 0 is given in appendix A.6.2. It now only
remains to find the estimates Sw,N from the data. We follow standard practice
and employ the Newey West estimator, which truncates the infinite sum in (54)
and weighs the autocovariances in a particular way. This is standard and we do
not describe the details here. It is the diagonal terms of bΣS,N that we use for
the denominator in the t-ratio.
Our baseline procedure for choosing parameter values described above can
be thought of as a hybrid between the method of simulated moments (MSM)
and calibration. It diﬀers from fully-fledged MSM (described below) because
we do not perform any formal estimation, we do not attempt to use an optimal
weighting matrix, and because we do not think of this as an exercise in accepting
or rejecting the model. Instead, our procedure is simply a way of systematically
choosing parameter values that allows us to display the behavior of the model
and to interpret the t-ratios as giving a measure of goodness of fit.
We also diﬀer from calibration because we do not pin down each parame-
ter with a given moment and use the remaining moments to test the model.
Instead, we let the algorithm find the parameters that best fit the statistics
considered. Moreover, in our procedure the standard deviation of the momentbσSi is computed from the data, we already commented on the advantages of
this option in the text, when we discussed the baseline calibration.
In addition to the baseline calibration procedure above, we engage in a ro-
bustness exercise, reported under the heading ‘full matrix’ in table 6, which is
a version of MSM. In particular, we choose parameters to solvebθN ≡ argmin
θ
[S(MN (θ))− S(MN )]0 bΣ−1S,N [S(MN (θ))− S(MN )] (57)
subject to the constraints in the text. The only diﬀerence from standard practice
in MSM is that instead of using model moments computed from long simulations
of the model we use averages of short run simulations S(MN (θ)). This way of
45
fitting the model is less intuitive but generally has the advantage that bΣ−1S,N is
an optimal weighting matrix so the estimate should be closer to the true model
parameter if the model was the true one and if asymptotic distribution is to
be trusted. One problem we encountered is that bΣS,N is nearly singular and
it is well known that in this case the weighting matrix in short samples does
not produce good results. While the literature suggests ways to address this
problem, this is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
A.6.1 The statistic and moment functions
This section gives explicit expressions for the statistic function S(·) and the
moment functions h(·) introduced in appendix A.6.
The underlying sample moments are
MN ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M1,N
.
.
.
M9,N
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡ 1
N
NX
t=1
h(yt)
where h(·) and yt are defined as
h(yt) ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
rst
PDt
(rst )
2
(PDt)
2
PDt PDt−1
rs,20t−20³
rs,20t−20
´2
rs,20t−20PDt−20
rbt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, yt ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
PDt
Dt/Dt−1
PDt−1
Dt−1/Dt−2
...
PDt−19
Dt−19/Dt−20
PDt−20
rbt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where rs,20t denotes the stock return over 20 quarters, which can be computed
using from yt using (PDt,Dt/Dt−1, ..., PDt−19,Dt−19/Dt−20).
The eight statistics we consider can be expressed as function of the moments:
S(M) ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
E(rst )
E(PDt)
σrst
σPDt
ρPD,−1
c52
R25
E(rbt )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M1
M2q
M3 − (M1)2q
M4 − (M2)2
M5−(M2)2
M4−(M2)2
c52(M)
R25(M)
M9
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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where the functions c52(M) and R
2
5(M) defining the OLS and R
2 coeﬃcients of
the excess returns regressions, respectively, are
c5(M) ≡
∙
1 M2
M2 M4
¸−1 ∙
M6
M8
¸
R25(M) ≡ 1−
M7 − [M6,M8] c5(M)
M7 − (M6)2
A.6.2 Derivatives of the statistic function
This appendix gives explicit expressions for ∂S/∂M 0 using the statistic function
stated in appendix A.6.1. We need this in order to find bΣS,N . Straightforward
but tedious algebra shows
∂Si
∂Mj
= 1 for (i, j) = (1, 1), (2, 2), (8, 9)
∂Si
∂Mi
=
1
2Si(M) for i = 3, 4
∂Si
∂Mj
=
−Mj
Si(M) for (i, j) = (3, 1), (4, 2)
∂S5
∂M2
=
2M2(M5 −M4)
(M4 −M22 )2
,
∂S5
∂M5
=
1
M4 −M22
,
∂S5
∂M4
= − M5 −M
2
2
(M4 −M22 )
2
∂S6
∂Mj
=
∂c52(M)
∂Mj
for i = 2, 4, 6, 8
∂S7
∂Mj
=
[M6,M8]
∂c5(M)
∂Mj
M7 −M26
for j = 2, 4
∂S7
∂M6
=
h
c51(M) + [M6,M8]
∂c5(M)
∂M6
i ¡
M7 −M26
¢
− 2M6 [M6,M8] c5(M)
(M7 −M26 )
2
∂S7
∂M7
=
M26 − [M6,M8] c5(M)
(M7 −M26 )
2
∂S7
∂M8
=
c52(M) + [M6,M8]
∂c5(M)
∂M8
M7 −M26
Using the formula for the inverse of a 2x2 matrix
c5(M) =
1
M4 −M22
∙
M4M6 −M2M8
M8 −M2M6
¸
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we have
∂c5(M)
∂M2
=
1
M4 −M22
µ
2M2c5(M)−
∙
M8
M6
¸¶
∂c5(M)
∂M4
=
1
M4 −M22
µ
−c5(M) +
∙
M6
0
¸¶
∂c5(M)
∂M6
≡ 1
M4 −M22
∙
M4
−M2
¸
∂c5(M)
∂M8
≡ 1
M4 −M22
∙
−M2
1
¸
All remaining terms ∂Si/∂Mj not listed above are equal to zero.
A.6.3 Diﬀerentiable projection facility
As discussed in the main text, we need to introduce a feature that prevents
perceived stock price growth from being higher than δ−1, so as to insure a finite
stock price. In addition, it is convenient for our calibration exercises if the
learning scheme is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function, see the discussion
in appendix A.6. The standard projection facility as in (16) causes a simulated
series for a given realization Pt(θ.ωs) to be discontinuous in θ, because the price
will jump at a parameter value where the facility is exactly binding.
We thus introduce a projection facility that ‘phases in’ more gradually. We
define
β∗t = βt−1 +
1
αt
"µ
Dt−1
Dt−2
¶−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
#
(58)
and modify the updating scheme (28) to
βt =
½
β∗t if β
∗
t ≤ βL
βL + w(β∗t − βL)(βU − βL) otherwise
(59)
where βU is the upper bound on beliefs, chosen to insure that the implied PD
ratio is always less than a certain upper bound UPD ≡ δa
1−δβU , where β
L < βU
is some arbitrary level of beliefs above which the projection facility starts to
operate, and w(·) : R+ → [0, 1] is a weighting function. Since w(β∗t ) is between
zero and one this formula insures that the beliefs are below βU . We further
require that w is increasing, w(0) = 0 and w(∞) = 1, and we want to insure
that the resulting beliefs are continuously diﬀerentiable w.r.t. β∗t at the point
βL.
In particular, we define
w(x) = 1− β
U − βL
x+ βU − βL
.
With this weighting function
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lim
β∗t%βL
βt = lim
β∗t&βL
βt = β
L
lim
β∗t&βL
∂βt
∂β∗t
= 1
lim
β∗t→∞
βt = β
U
In our numerical applications we choose βU so that the implied PD ratio
never exceeds UPD = 500 and βL = δ−1 − 2(δ−1 − βU ), which implies that the
dampening eﬀect of the projection facility starts to come into eﬀect for values
of the PD ratio above 250.
Figure 4 shows how the standard projection facility operates versus the con-
tinuous projection facility proposed in this appendix. It displays the discontinu-
ity introduced by the standard projection facility: once the regular update β∗t
exceeds its upper bound βU (the upper horizontal line in the graph), βt will not
be updated but remain at its previous level (assumed to be 1.007). The contin-
uous projection facility smoothly dampens the update once β∗t starts exceeding
βU (the lower horizontal line) with the dampening factor increasing so that βt
will never exceed βU . The graph also shows that for most β∗t the projection
facility is irrelevant. For this graph βRE = 1.0035.
A.7 Convergence of least squares to RE
We show global convergence when agents use least squares learning and they
have risk aversion as in section 4. The proof shows global convergence, that
is, it obtains a stronger result than is usually found in many applications using
the associated o.d.e. approach. The proof below is for the standard projection
facility.
We assume Dt ≥ 0 with probability one, which requires that εt ≥ 0. We
also need ε1−γt to be bounded, formally we assume existence of some positive
Uε <∞ such that
Prob(ε1−γt < U
ε) = 1
This excludes log-normality (except for the case of log utility) but it still allows
for a rather general distribution for εt. Obviously, if γ < 1 this is satisfied if εt
is bounded above a.s. by a finite constant, and if γ > 1 this is satisfied if εt is
bounded away from zero. The highest PD ratio that can be achieved with the
projection facility is denoted as UPD ≡ δβ
U
1−δβU <∞.
We first show that the projection facility will almost surely cease to be
binding after some finite time. In a second step, we prove that βt converges to
βRE from that time onwards.
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Figure 3: Projection Facilities
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Figure 4: Projection facilities
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The standard projection facility implies
∆βt =
(
α−1t
³
(aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
if βt−1 + α
−1
t
³
(aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
< βU
0 otherwise
(60)
If the lower equality applies one has α−1t (aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
≥ βt−1 ≥ 0 and this
shows the following inequality
βt ≤ βt−1 + α−1t
µ
(aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¶
(61)
holds for all t a.s., whether or not the projection facility is binding at t. We also
have that ¯¯
βt − βt−1
¯¯
≤ α−1t
¯¯¯¯
(aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¯¯¯¯
(62)
holds for all t a.s., because if βt < β
U this holds with equality and if βt−1 +
α−1t
³
(aεt−1)
−γ Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
´
≥ βU then
¯¯
βt − βt−1
¯¯
= 0.
Substituting recursively backwards in (61) for past β’s delivers the first line
in
βt ≤
1
t− 1 + α1
⎛
⎝(α1 − 1) β0 +
t−1X
j=0
(aεj)
−γ Pj
Pj−1
⎞
⎠
=
t
t− 1 + α1
⎛
⎝(α1 − 1) β0
t
+
1
t
t−1X
j=0
(a εj)
1−γ
⎞
⎠
| {z }
=T1
+
1
t− 1 + α1
⎛
⎝
t−1X
j=0
δ ∆βj
1− δβj
(aεj)
1−γ
⎞
⎠
| {z }
=T2
(63)
a.s., where the second line follows from (30). Clearly, T1 → 1(0+E((a εj)1−γ)) =
βRE as t→∞ a.s. Also, if we can establish |T2|→ 0 a.s. this will show that βt
will eventually be bounded away from its upper bound or, more formally, that
lim supt→∞ βt ≤ βRE < βU . This is achieved by noting that
|T2| ≤ 1t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
δ (a εj)
1−γ
1− δβj
¯¯
∆βj
¯¯
≤ U
ε
t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
a1−γδ
¯¯
∆βj
¯¯
1− δβj
≤ U
ε
t− 1 + α1
δa1−γ
1− δβU
t−1X
j=0
¯¯
∆βj
¯¯
(64)
a.s., where the first inequality results from the triangle inequality and the fact
that both εj and 11−δβj are positive, the second inequality follows from the a.s.
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bound on εj , and the third inequality from βt ≤ βU . Next, observe that a.s. for
all t
(aεt)
−γ Pt
Pt−1
=
1− δβt−1
1− δβt
(aεt)
1−γ <
(aεt)
1−γ
1− δβt
<
a1−γUε
1− δβU
(65)
where the equality follows from (29), the first inequality from βt−1 > 0, and the
second inequality from the bounds on ε and βt. Applying the triangle inequality
in the right side of equation (62), using (65) and βt−1 < β
U gives the inequality
in
1
t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
¯¯
∆βj
¯¯
≤ 1
t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
α−1j
µ
a1−γUε
1− δβU
+ βU
¶
=
µ
a1−γUε
1− δβU
+ βU
¶
1
t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
1
j − 1 + α1
(66)
the equality follows from simple algebra. Now, for any ζ > 0
t−1
tX
i=0
i−1 = tζ−1
tX
i=0
t−ζi−1 ≤ t−1+ζ
tX
i=0
i−(1+ζ) → 0 as t→∞
where the convergence follows from the well known fact that the over-harmonic
series
Pt
i=0 i
−(1+ζ) is convergent. This and the fact that the large parenthesis
in (66) is finite implies
1
t− 1 + α1
t−1X
j=0
¯¯
∆βj
¯¯
→ 0 for all t a.s.
Then (64) implies that |T2| → 0 a.s. as t → ∞. Taking the lim sup on both
sides of (63), it follows from T1 → βRE and |T2|→ 0 that
lim sup
t→∞
βt ≤ βRE < βU
a.s. The projection facility is thus binding finitely many periods with probability
one.
We now proceed with the second step of the proof. Consider for a given
realization a finite period t where the projection facility is not binding for all
t > t. Then the upper equality in (60) holds for all t > t and simple algebra
gives
βt =
1
t− t+ αt
⎛
⎝
t−1X
j=t
(aεj)
−γ Pj
Pj−1
+ αt βt
⎞
⎠
=
t− t
t− t+ αt
⎛
⎝ 1
t− t
t−1X
j=t
(aεj)
1−γ
+
1
t− t
t−1X
j=t
δ ∆βj
1− δβj
(aεj)
1−γ
+
αt
t− t βt
⎞
⎠
(67)
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for all t > t. Equations (61) and (62) now hold with equality for all t > t.
Similar operations as before then deliver
1
t− t
t−1X
j=t
δ ∆βj
1− δβj
(aεj)
1−γ → 0
a.s. for t→∞. Finally, taking the limit on both sides of (67) establishes
βt → a1−γE(ε
1−γ
t ) = β
RE
a.s. as t→∞.¥
References
Abel, A. B. (1990): “Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up
with the Joneses,” American Economic Review, 80, 38—42.
Adam, K. (2003): “Learning and Equilibrium Selection in a Monetary Over-
lapping Generations Model with Sticky Prices,” Review of Economic Studies,
70, 887—908.
Adam, K., A. Marcet, and J. P. Nicolini (2008): “Individual Rationality
and Asset Prices,” mimeo.
Branch, W., and G. W. Evans (2006): “Asset Return Dynamics and Learn-
ing,” University of Oregon mimeo.
Bray, M. M., and D. M. Kreps (1987): “Rational Learning and Rational
Expectations,” in Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, ed. by
G. Feiwel, pp. 597—625. New York University Press, New York.
Brennan, M. J., and Y. Xia (2001): “Stock Price Volatility and Equity
Premium,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47, 249—283.
Brock, W. A., and C. H. Hommes (1998): “Heterogeneous Beliefs and
Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 22, 1235—1274.
Bullard, J., and J. Duffy (2001): “Learning and Excess Volatility,” Macro-
economic Dynamics, 5, 272—302.
Campbell, J. Y. (2003): “Consumption-Based Asset Pricing,” in Handbook of
Economics and Finance, ed. by G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz,
pp. 803—887. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane (1999): “By Force of Habit:
A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,”
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 205—251.
53
Carceles-Poveda, E., and C. Giannitsarou (2007): “Asset Pricing with
Adaptive Learning,” Review of Economic Dynamics (forthcoming).
Cecchetti, S., P.-S. Lam, and N. C. Mark (2000): “Asset Pricing with
Distorted Beliefs: Are Equity Returns Too Good to Be True?,” American
Economic Review, 90, 787—805.
Cochrane, J. H. (2005): Asset Pricing (Revised Edition). Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, USA.
Cogley, T., and T. J. Sargent (2006): “The Market Price of Risk and the
Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?,” New York University
mimeo.
Evans, G. W., and S. Honkapohja (2001): Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Kocherlakota, N. (1990): “On the ’Discount’ Factor in Growth Economies,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 25, 43—47.
LeRoy, S. F., and R. Porter (1981): “The Present-Value Relation: Test
Based on Implied Variance Bounds,” Econometrica, 49, 555—574.
Lucas, R. E. (1978): “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica,
46, 1426—1445.
Mankiw, G., D. Romer, and M. D. Shapiro (1985): “An Unbiased Reex-
amination of Stock Market Volatility,” Journal of Finance, 40(3), 677—687.
Marcet, A., and J. P. Nicolini (2003): “Recurrent Hyperinflations and
Learning,” American Economic Review, 93, 1476—1498.
Marcet, A., and T. J. Sargent (1989): “Convergence of Least Squares
Learning Mechanisms in Self Referential Linear Stochastic Models,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 48, 337—368.
(1992): “The Convergence of Vector Autoregressions to Rational Ex-
pectations Equilibria,” in Macroeconomics: A Survey of Research Strategies,
ed. by A. Vercelli, and N. Dimitri, pp. 139—164. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
(1995): “Speed of Convergence of Recursive Least Square Learning
with ARMA Perceptions,” in Learning and Rationality in Economics, ed. by
M. Salmon, and A. Kirman, pp. 179—215. Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
Shiller, R. J. (1981): “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by
Subsequent Changes in Dividends?,” American Economic Review, 71, 421—
436.
(2005): Irrational Exuberance: Second Edition. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, USA.
54
Timmermann, A. (1993): “How Learning in Financial Markets Generates Ex-
cess Volatility and Predictability in Stock Prices,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 108, 1135—1145.
(1996): “Excess Volatility and Predictability of Stock Prices in Au-
toregressive Dividend Models with Learning,” Review of Economic Studies,
63, 523—557.
Voth, H. J. (2003): “With a Bang, Not a Whimper: Pricking Germany’s
’Stockmarket Bubble’ in 1927 and the Slide Into Depression,” Journal of
Economic History, 63, 65—99.
55
